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'Pass the Pitons' Pete
Big Wall climber
like Ontario, Canada, eh?
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Scary as hell, Locker, cuz we've all done it, but were lucky enough to get away with it [so far].
Be vigilant always.
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John Vawter
Social climber
San Diego
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I don't think it's possible for a human to be constantly vigilant while climbing. Nor necessary. It’s an activity where the degree of risk varies greatly from moment to moment. So it's necessary to recognize the situations where the potential for errors and risk to life and limb increases dramatically. That's the time to focus attention on the essential precautions to the exclusion of everything else, until you are satisfied. I would put tying in, setting up a belay, the arrival and departure of a climber at a belay, rappelling and being lowered on the short list. This is where I check and double check.
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Gene
climber
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Accident Analysis Conclusion: Ready, Fire, Aim!
So sad.
gm
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couchmaster
climber
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wbw said "Couchmaster, the accident that you are refering to at Smith, all those years ago involved a close friend of mine. She was the person at the top of the climb, and if I remember correctly, her anchor failed. Deb had a wonderful spirit about her, and her death touched many in a very profound way.
At the memorial service, there was a poem that was printed for those of us that were grieving. It had Deb's picture, and I know I have it saved somewhere; I do not know if I can find it in a timely manner, so I'll paraphrase the poem in the hopes that it helps Woody's family and friends. It really helped me 23 years ago."
When I'm gone
Think of me
But not too much
Cry for me
But not too much
Do not let your sadness at my passing
Prevent you from smiling at my memory.
That's a nice poem wbw. I hope it gives Woodys loved ones some fresh air and help from the pain they must be feeling. Regarding Trezlar, the news stories totally butchered the details, as her anchor did not fail as you suggest. We were guiding at the time (Gini Hornbecker and I) got there asap and did our best. 2 months after Deb and he partner passed away there was another one equally messed up again at Smith a short distance away. @40 feet directly below us, got there even faster but CPR for 20 min was ineffective. It seems to me that you can't get very far from these kinds of graphic details once they are inside your mind. If you want to hear them you have but to ask. If you don't, that's fine too, I totally understand.
regards
Bill
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Edited: I need to just lay it out here now in a nice way in the short version. "The Lesson" is the title to this thread after all. It was eerily similar as Woody and Al's accident. If even a single person reads it and takes it to heart, I'll have done something good by sharing it so I will.
Deb and this big hulking fella had finished the 2nd pitch of Trezlar. A Sweet 2 pitch 5.10a crack at Smith Rocks. I believe Deb had not been able to get a piece out, and from the ledge, they decided to lower the big fella down to get it out (supposition as I cannot otherwise explain these actions). They had 2 ropes, which they had joined and ran through a rap anchor @ 10 feet to the West. They had also put a medium friend, @ #2 directly behind them for pro to be more in line with the forces of the lower, but it was only @ 1/2 way into a crumbling slot and looked insecure. The cam had a biner and about 10' from the the end of the rope was clove hitched onto the biner. (so the rope then ran over to the rap anchor where it was joined with another rope and that's where the end of it was -joined to another rope) They had untied and must have been relaxing but Deb was NOT tied into the rope at all. She had her shoes kicked off and was barefoot: the rack was off to the side. She put him on belay via an atc style device and started lowering him. She got him down @ 20-25 feet when his weight pulled her off. She was a small thing, I'd guess 90 lbs and he was the opposite at @250 lbs and a size 11-12 shoe I'd guess. When they fell, they made it @ 100 feet straight down and they each in turn struck the same ledge and then fell the rest of the full rope length. When we got there they were both still on the rope, he was 5 feet from the ground. Her belay device had locked and she was @ 20-25 feet above, his weight in effect pining her where she was. Our first response was that we could cut the rope at his waist, but we didn't have a jug and were afraid that once the weight was off the rope, we might lose the end of the rope and she would fall the rest of the way uncontrolled. We thought she was gone then, but as we were not 100 % sure, we went with the safest way which meant climbing up the descent pitch, backing up their gear to make an anchor with a lowering setup with their rope through it, cut the sling on the cam (as the knot was jammed too much to budge it and it still had the 350 lbs on it and we still didn't have jumars or a pully), and lower them down. We wanted to do that work quickly but without killing ourselves as well, because we were standing unroped and unanchored ourselves at the top on that small ledge 2 pitches up the cliff and looking at a long fall.
That shitty, rattly, half in friend held their combined weight for a full pitch fall. We gave the gear to the firemen and statements to the sheriff.
Sorry that you lost your friend. There was nothing we could do that we didn't' do. That's how it went down as near as we could see, and we were the only 2 to see it. I suspect the sheriff was not understanding what we described, however, I have a vague memory of drawing the rigging for him.
BTW, I was thinking this earlier but it needs to be said: big props, no HUGE ONES to Matt for his fast response and right choices on this one. I told him that it was a perfect thing in a bad situation, where you have a kick-assed climber who can just flash up and can get you down fast, and there on the ground is a doctor waiting to help you on the next critical step. If either one was not there......Al might not be here with us either. Shock can be sudden and it's real. Props to the Dr and all who helped or tried to assist.
I wish Woody was here and reading my words right now is all.
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wskish
Mountain climber
Saratoga, CA
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The problem is that it is not possible for humans to be vigilant 100% of the time. For instance, professional security screeners at airports routinely fail to detect guns and knives purposely placed in luggage as security tests: http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2006/03/airport_passeng.html
As Schneier notes, "This psychological phenomenon isn't just a problem in airport screening: It's been identified in inspections of all kinds".
So given that we can't be perfectly vigilant 100% of the time, it becomes useful to recognize those times when we might be at higher risk and hence need to be especially vigilant. While there are many potential 'vigilance triggers', one that really scares the hell of out me is 'complexity'. Complex systems are guaranteed to fail a lot more than simple systems.
In this case, the complexity of a system with three climbers and two ropes is somewhat higher than the complexity of a two-climber one-rope system. While climbers safely manage that level of complexity all the time, it is useful to be aware of situations that have a higher potential for failure and use that awareness to somehow catalyze vigilance.
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jbar
Social climber
urasymptote
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Thank you for posting. This is the second recent reminder I have had about checking and weighing my anchor before trusting it. Not long ago I caught a friend as she leaned back after tying in with a clove hitch. She had the knot wrong and started to fall. Out last week with a new climber I made sure he knew about testing his weight on the anchor before going off belay. This reminder could have saved a life.
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BillL
Trad climber
NM
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Respectfully (not regarding this specific accident), I suggest caution about collective responsibility encompassing a set of critical climbing tasks. When many people are responsible everyone has a tendancy to relax a little - how could one critical task be missed with so many looking? So the 'canvas' made up of those critical tasks has a tendancy to get addressed in sort of a shotgun pattern.
In collective responsibility, there's also a tendancy to go with what most folks are thinking (edit: or with the most persuasive) instead of independently thinking about it. When one knowledgable person is responsible or feels solely responsible for a set of critical tasks, it is more likely that each critical task will get properly scrutinized.
Of course, second checks are good. But, in this view, if a problem is missed by all, any second checker(s) would say "Geez, I'm sorry I didn't catch your mistake, Bob."
That's one view. It has backing in at least one accident-sensitive industry (edit: although I don't claim to have done the position proper justice).
Bill
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Richard
climber
Bend, OR.
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One aspect of this that hasn't been discuss is: How was Al lowered to the ground?
I'm curious fron a SAR P.O.V. I'm guessing JOSAR didn't do the pickoff.
Anyone??
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graniteclimber
Trad climber
Nowhere
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healyje wrote, "and stunned folks couldn't simply wait for the official technical analysis before devolving multiple threads into unrestrained sprayfests."
While we have a lot more facts then we had before, we still don't have anything approaching an "official technical analysis." But that doesn't stop spray about who the "onus" was on.
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monolith
Trad climber
Berkeley
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And who is expected to provide the 'official' technical analysis?
I would be surprised if there is one, at least not the kind we expect.
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graniteclimber
Trad climber
Nowhere
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" In that regard of checking each other's harness, knots, etc., I for one still cringe when someone wants to check my business or have me check theirs - I rope-solo for half of all my free climbing and do double check all my business and it also just grates against all of my old school sensibilities and notions of what climbing is 'all about' relative to self-reliance....there's probably a lesson and warning in there for me to not be so onerous about other folks checking my business."
In my opinion, if people are being belayed/lowered of your harness, then your harness and tie-in are no longer just your business, they are also their business. Your harness and tie-in are part of their safety system. By checking them they are aking responsibility for their own safety and practicing self-reliance.
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graniteclimber
Trad climber
Nowhere
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"And who is expected to provide the 'official' technical analysis?
I would be surprised if there is one, at least not the kind we expect."
The NPS should finish their report months from now. But they dropped the ball on the initial report, so I have low expectations.
But if you look at the hard facts we have--look at Clint's summary--we only have a nutshell account and most of that is from Locker. In my opinion, there's not enough there to start pointing fingers. Who really knows how it happened? It's all speculation.
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healyje
Trad climber
Portland, Oregon
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There is no need to 'point fingers' under any circumstance regardless of reporting on the incident, technical or otherwise. Ascertaining facts has some utility, assigning 'blame' or casting 'judgment' regardless of what facts ultimately emerge has none.
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graniteclimber
Trad climber
Nowhere
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"There is no need to 'point fingers' under any circumstance regardless of reporting on the incident, technical or otherwise."
Maybe you didn't type what you meant to? Look up "onus" in a dictionary. http://www.thefreedictionary.com/onus
Edit: Locker, you are EXACTLY RIGHT!
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healyje
Trad climber
Portland, Oregon
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I'm not. I'm using the word with respect to 'responsibility' and 'burden' (which everyone who us who ties into to a rope owns), not 'blame'. You either aren't reading my posts or are not grasping the difference between specific, technical causality and 'blame' or 'judgment'. Accidents in climbing and other endeavors have specific causality chains described by facts of the incident. There need be no judgment whatsoever around them - facts are facts - again, there is no more good served ignoring those facts then in attempting to assign blame to them - both are simply futile and pointless efforts.
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graniteclimber
Trad climber
Nowhere
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Healje: "You either aren't reading my posts or are not grasping the difference between specific, technical causality and 'blame' or 'judgment'.
I have read your posts and I can even quote them. You are either being dishonest, or you can not comprehend what you wrote in your own post.
Healje, you wrote, "From what I can tell the onus was on Al, regardless of any interruptions by Woody, to insure he was setup safely at the anchor whether for just being there, bringing up Wendell, or lowering Woody. I would suspect distraction was more or less the sole culprit here and that attitudes, histories, and the interactions of personalities were very minor contributing factors at best."
"Accidents in climbing and other endeavors have specific causality chains described by facts of the incident. There need be no judgment whatsoever around them - facts are facts - again, there is no more good served ignoring those facts then in attempting to assign blame to them - both are simply futile and pointless efforts."
You appear to be unclear as to the difference between a fact and a value judgment. "Old school sensibilities" and prejudices are not facts.
Also, you are not basing your value judgment on facts but speculation. I can speculate scenarios which place the "onus" on either one, but it's just speculation. Please don't pretend you're basing it on any "official technical analysis."
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graniteclimber
Trad climber
Nowhere
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Healje: " In this or any other case, and regardless of presence or absence of any safety checks, each and every one of us is 'responsible' for securing ourselves to an anchor at the top of a pitch and checking to insure that we accomplished that as well. That's a 'fact' and not a matter of 'blame' or a 'judgment' call."
If you think that is a "fact" and not a "judgment call" than you don't understand what a fact is. You don't understand what a judgment call is either. Your statement as to who is responsible for tying in is a judgment call, not a fact.
"I for one still cringe when someone wants to check my business or have me check theirs - I rope-solo for half of all my free climbing and do double check all my business and it also just grates against all of my old school sensibilities and notions of what climbing is 'all about' relative to self-reliance."
I keep coming back to this because it demonstrates, to me, a lack of understanding of the social and technical dynamics of team (non-solo) climbing. But with this background, I can understand why you jumped to the conclusions you did about the accident.
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healyje
Trad climber
Portland, Oregon
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It's a different approach to understanding from my perspective. I have no judgment or blame around why Al ended up not being anchored and it likely could just as easily been me under the same circumstances. That Al did end up unanchored is, however, a fact related by folks who were there, not any speculation on my part.
You are right that, underpinning everything I say is the primary and unwaivering tenant of my 'old school' worldview of climbing that responsibility begins - but doesn't necessarily end with - the individual in all cases, in all circumstances, and from the moment you leave your car until the moment you return to it. I find any notion of group or 'team' responsibility somehow surplanting individual responsibility under any circumstance deeply disturbing in the extreme. Group or 'team' responsibility can certainly complement individual responsibility, but it cannot and should never replace it. The concept of individual responsibility and you being ultimately responsible for your life is the very heart and soul of 'safety' in my worldview, in and out of climbing. But again, and the problem I think you're having with that, is you are coupling blame to responsibility - from my perspective that is utterly pointless in dealing with an accident or it's aftermath.
An infrequent part of my business is technology-related disaster recovery - tens of millions of dollars per day and lives can be at stake when I get a call of that type. Backward-looking responsibility ascription (blame) is both entirely irrelevant and counterproductive in such circumstances; understanding the facts and causality chain, or what is sometimes called forward-looking responsibility ascription is, on the other hand, essential to ending a disaster and to the process of restoring services. The same sort of approach or mindset is used in sorting out complex, large-scale outages of power grids, fires, oil spills, aviation accidents, etc.
Ascribing moral accountability or blame is a behavioral default in our society, and I understand it is difficult for most people to seperate notions of responsibility from those of moral 'accountability' and 'blame'. That it's hard for the average person to accept the idea and paradox of someone being responsible yet not at fault or to blame. However, understanding the roles involved with accidents, the scope of responsibility associated with those roles, and the options available to each to exercise those responsibilities are at the heart of both accident analysis and disaster recovery. In climbing, anchoring is more strongly associated with, and ascribed to, the role of belayer rather than any climbing or lowered role because those roles are quickly dislocated from the anchor and any possibility of exercising responsibility over it.
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BillL
Trad climber
NM
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Does anyone know/recall which route they climbed? Locker? Wendell?
Bill
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