El Cap Storm of Oct, 2004: A Retrospective Analysis

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David Nelson

climber
San Francisco
Topic Author's Original Post - Jan 28, 2005 - 04:04pm PT
I think it is no overstatement to say that the entire SuperTopo community was deeply saddened by the deaths of the Japanese team (Mariko Ryugo, 27, and Ryoichi Yamanoto, 26) during the severe spring storm October 17-20, 2004. (The only other team to previously freeze on the Nose, eerily enough, was a team of two Japanese climbers, 20 years to the week.) There were several threads active throughout the rescues and in the days that followed, each seeking information and possible lessons. There was much speculation and some (to my mind) terribly irresponsible comments made (criticising YOSAR's decision making, etc. The worst comment was "why didn't anyone go save them?!", asked by an El Cap veteran who should have known better and should be ashamed). Wiser voices advised patience, that the facts would finally come out, and the analysis should await the time when all the facts were on the table. (WBraun: "Lots of questions are being asked, wait till everyone is back and Link or someone else will give a full report.")

I think now that that time has come. YOSAR has posted a report (although I believe a more complete one, tailored to climbers, is in the works). Personally, I want to learn what I can from the tragedy and successful rescues (Dave Turner [Tempest], Tommy Thompson and Eric Ericson [NeverNever Land],unknown[Salathe]) and successful self-rescues (bails?) (PTPP [Born Under A Bad Sign], Ivo Ninov, Jason Pickles and Leo Holding [attempted free route starting in the Eagle's Way]). Why did some die and some not, what works or does not work, what does the experience of those involved (both climbers and rescuers) teach the climbing community?

It would keep this thread tight and on topic if you would read the report on Friends of Yosemite Search and Rescue and the other treads on this topic before you add your two cents.

Friends of YOSAR (http://www.supertopo.com/climbing/thread.html?m=59763&f=0&b=0);

Are the El Cap folks OK? (Melissa's thread was the first one on the topic)
http://www.supertopo.com/climbing/thread.html?m=45362&f=0&b=0

Question for Werner (PTPP's thread asking for Werner's insights)
(http://www.supertopo.com/climbing/thread.html?m=58916&f=35&b=0);

Getting Plucked off El Cap (by Tommy Thompson, who was on NeverNever Land during the storm and was rescued)
http://www.supertopo.com/climbing/thread.html?m=45776#msg46030

Some of the lessons that came out of these threads:
(1) Be prepared for the worst possible weather. Tommy felt that the quality of their portaledge (A5 Cliff Cabana with a 4 season fly) saved their lives. Bivouac sacks may be lifesaving, even if you have a portaledge with a fly. Tommy said everything was soaked very quickly, despite their top quality ledge. See his thread for more info. The fallen team had sleeping bags, bivi sacs, a tarp, and a stove, but no portaledge, no waterproof coat/pants, at least the woman did not have warm, synthetic underclothes. Not all climbers know that "worst possible weather" includes the fact that your bivi site may in fact be the site of a waterfall, even with just a slight rain. The Japanese team's final bivi site, Camp VI, is a known drainage route for much of the area of El Cap, and becomes a veritable waterfall in even slight rains. An unfortunate choice when a big storm hits, and that alone might kill you, even if you have the best of equipment. (I was at Camp VI three days after a rain and the waterfall was still flowing!)
Yosemite weather is notorious for sudden changes. The week prior to the storm was t-shirt climbing weather, which turned out to be a lethal suckerpunch for our fallen Japanese colleagues. Listen to a weather forecast before you blast, but you still need to be prepared for bad weather (unless you believe that the weatherman has never been wrong...)
(2) Communication equipment with backup is essential. Cell phones have the advantage that your communication is not limited to those on the ground, but is limited by fact that you cannot get service on all parts of the Captain. Family band radio (TalkAbout) will always reach to a ground party. Inability to communicate doomed the Japanese team and contributed considerably to the successful rescue of the other teams. Also, consider that the rescue teams can make better and safer decisions if they know you are OK but need help as opposed to will die if you don't get help right away. Tommy had a TalkAbout, the Japanese team had no communications equipment.
(3) Have a designated ground contact person, who will be in contact with you on a regular basis and can interface with YOSAR should that be necessary. (Will compensate for communications failures, etc)
(4) YOSAR folks did a hell of a job, were on top of the situation from the beginning, and were strongly praised by all those who were rescued. Their recommendation: keep your trap shut with criticism until you know the facts.

I would appreciate any input from YOSAR, those involved, and experienced climbers who have been in similar circumstances, as well as anyone who wants to add to the analysis.

(Sorry about the long post, but the topic is rather serious. Thanks in advance for not flaming, let's keep this a climbing thread.)
WBraun

climber
Jan 28, 2005 - 04:23pm PT
Generally speaking……

“keep your trap shut with criticism until you know the facts.”.

David, criticism without known facts is alright, generally human nature.

That’s why we have forums.

“Family band radio (TalkAbout) will always reach to a ground party.”

Until the batteries go dead!

Lol, We had one once where Lober’s talking this guy through of what he should do to get himself out of his jam when the guys radio goes dead. Kinda like tech support on the phone.

Good write up my friend and yes a lot of good lessons can be learned.
Southern Man

climber
Jan 28, 2005 - 04:37pm PT
Another perspective is the recent R&I article. I, like many others on this site did and have kept up with this story since it started unfolding. After reading the recent R&I article, I must say that I've gained new information about the rescue that reinforces my admiration of those involved, both rescued and rescuer. I thought Pete Takada wrote a good article. IMHO.
David Nelson

climber
San Francisco
Topic Author's Reply - Jan 28, 2005 - 06:40pm PT
Thanks, Werner. (I have met you only once, but it was during an El Cap rescue! Luckily, I was an observer, not the rescue-ee.) I agree with "until the batteries go dead", which is why I said in my post "with backup." Not only can the batteries go dead but the unit could be hurt in a fall. Backup the critical systems. Luckily, a second TalkAbout is light and can go in the bottom of the safety kit stuff sack.
Melissa

Big Wall climber
oakland, ca
Jan 28, 2005 - 08:39pm PT
"Someone needs to be held accountable if poor decisions were made."

What happened to the Japanese team was a tragendy. Still...

None of us are a priori entitled to a rescue.

If you climb El Cap (or anything), you accept a certain risk of death.

If I die in the elements on El Cap, it is my fault and my fault alone because I choose to take that risk.

If YOSAR ever saves my ass, I'll be eternally grateful to them. I still think that it would be a gift, not a right, to get a needed rescue.

I don't think that YOSAR should be factored into peoples risk-mitigation plans. Assuming that if the weather goes hellishly bad, your chopper should be waiting (or else someone besides yourself will need to be held accountable if you freeze) at the first break in the weather, whether you've communicated a need for rescue or not, is what holding YOSAR accountable for not going up there sooner amounts to IMO. If it leads people to be less prepared than they might otherwise be, then it's doublely bad.

I don't want to have to get a permit or pay to climb a wall in Yosemite. Giving out unsolicited rescues for overdue or bad-weather parties by mandate makes that kind of individual surveylance and regulation necessary.
Lambone

Ice climber
Ashland, Or
Jan 28, 2005 - 08:44pm PT
that's a fair argument. I suppose they can only begin a rescue if specificaly asked by the climbers? I don't know...

everybody knew those guys were f*#ked up there, it wasn't a question of if they needed a rescue or not. Their friends knew they were in trouble.
David Nelson

climber
San Francisco
Topic Author's Reply - Jan 28, 2005 - 08:53pm PT
Lambone,

Thanks for your reasoned reply. We are all trying to learn from this.

With respect to PTPP's comment (I was not going to identify him, but since he is your bud and you did, I will go with the flow), he made it on Oct 24 at 9 pm. This was well after the posts by Link and Werner, stating that rescues had been undertaken, which would also imply the timeframe at which they were conceived and initiated. Their posts were on Thurs, Oct 21, which would imply that the planning for the rescues was going on on Tues at the latest and possibly Monday. Remember, the rescue was initiated without any request for help from the Japanese climbers and due to the conditions, would take more SAR personnel than were on hand in Yosemite. This is a heavy decision, to expend this much effort, involve this many people (eventually 110 people were involved), and subject all the rescuers to a lot of hardship and risk. If the climbers had been well-equipped, they should have been able to survive until the rescue Wednesday.

If the comment was meant to rhetorical, OK. If it was meant to be critical (and that is how I and many took it), it was off base. In hindsight, YOSAR had been monitoring the situation from the onset of the storm, Sunday, Oct 17. If I had been one of those struggling with the decision to launch or not, I would have felt stung by that comment.

My two cents, you can probably get change, for what it is worth. I don't want a flame war, I just want to learn.

{For those reading this long after the original posting, some posts above have been removed by their respective authors, after learning a bit and feeling squeamish about what they posted earlier. Makes it hard to understand the thread. -David Nelson, March 4, 2005)
WBraun

climber
Jan 29, 2005 - 12:24am PT
OMG…. unbelievable I’ll just take one of Lambones examples:

“Also:
"Mid-morning (about 1100 hours) on Tuesday, a decision was made to intervene without a clear indication of distress from the Japanese team and no know request for assistance from them. We began setting up a management team and devising a plan."

“First off, that time is false. Why because I was still in the lodge drinking coffee at 11am. At 12am we drove to the meadow and they were still setting up the PA.”

In one of my other posts on a different thread I said there were many things that Lambone was unaware of. Do you actually read??

The 1100 hours is the official time recorded in the log to start. You now have to call your people, get them ready to go in the field. The 1100 hours is not the time you log when your people are at the scene! In your case when YOU saw them first show up.

There’s a lot more but it’s not worth it for me and it’s not my job, plus I’m not going to step over chain of command.

Lambone, seriously you need to get all the facts from the know. That means call the office and GET IT FROM THE RIGHT PEOPLE.

I’m finished with this, say whatever you want I don’t give a sh-t. This last statement is directed to you only to you Lambone.

Good Luck
Greg Barnes

climber
Jan 29, 2005 - 01:01am PT
You gotta be on crack Lambone. Even if a SAR team were to make a mistake during a rescue, it could never be of the same order of magnitude as assuming ANY climber has the right to get rescued. Let's see, you said, "Someone needs to be held accountable if poor decisions were made". How about starting with all those climbers who assume that if they get up sh#t creek they'll get rescued? Then climbing itself is the "poor decision." End of story.

Melissa has it right - a rescue is a gift of life from many other human beings putting their own lives on the line, and is certainly not something we're entitled to.
Largo

Sport climber
Venice, Ca
Jan 29, 2005 - 01:41am PT
The moment you tie in and head up a rock wall, you and partner are just as you came into this world, and just as you will leave it: on your own.

JL
Karl Baba

Trad climber
Yosemite, Ca
Jan 29, 2005 - 02:22am PT
I believe the main accountability in rescue operations should be that the supervisors of rescue operations should be accountable for the risks that they put the other rescuers through. I think Yosar has a good record in that respect. It's the first thing you learn in EMT and other Emergency Med classes: Assure the scene is safe.

Well on El Cap after a storm it's not safe, but they make the best call they can and I'm not willing to hold their feet to the fire over if they called it right or not. Melissa is right. If Yosar become accountable for why they didn't rescue somebody in time, that is one step away from all kinds of mandatory restrictions and regulations. You'd have seasons off limits to climbing, climber ratings required to do walls (like they have for hang gliding) and fees too.

I can barely even believe that they hike 11 miles in deep snow and then rap off El Cap to go get folks. I'm grateful that the bonus of a rescue exists, and mad props to Yosar.

Sure, after a rescue, the team should debrief and ask if anything could have been safer or done better, but submitting to outside scrutiny and "accountability" is going too far in my mind.

Peace

karl
Ed Hartouni

Trad climber
Livermore, CA
Jan 29, 2005 - 04:58am PT
I believe that the issues surrounding this tragedy continue to swirl around YOSAR instead of the root cause: an unprepared climbing team.

It is no mystery to any climber that you take a finite risk when you put yourself into a situation that you are not prepared for. It is one of the biggest risks of climbing in California: the weather is so damned nice. So you roll the dice and you come up a winner... small risk.

The problem is that everyone thinks the risk decrease the more times you go out and don't get into trouble. This is the NASA justification for flying the shuttles prior to Columbia and Challenger: nothing bad happens so the probability is low that something bad will happen. Circular reasoning.

Fact is, every time you roll the dice it's a different game, no connection to the other times. What if you're on a winning streak and you don't know it!

So we learn by finding out what happened in other situations, other accidents, experiences, near misses, etc. We all know, those who care to know, that the weather can turn really bad, deadly, in our usually wonderful California winter. We all know that if we venture up onto the walls we have to be prepared. Sure, you can go up there without all the preparation and win, most times, but you are taking a risk. The tragedy is that what happened to the Japanese climbers probably didn't have to happen at all, if they had been prepared. It is frustrating that once they were in trouble that they couldn't be saved, but YOSAR is there at the end of the chain of events, it was the climbers that started that chain.

I am troubled by these deaths. But I do not know how to avoid such situations, climbers make the decision to launch, they must accept full responsibilities for their actions. It is harsh, but that is the tradition of our sport.
Roger Breedlove

Trad climber
Cleveland Heights, Ohio
Jan 29, 2005 - 09:09am PT
It seems to me that there are two separate discussions that should be kept separate.

One discussion asks if either YOSAR or the Japanese climbers had done things differently could the Japanese climbers been saved. It seems obvious, in hindsight, the answer is yes.

The danger here is that there is a very long continuum between inattention and decision making under uncertainty and irresponsibility. The truth of it is that almost always the rather lame--the best decisions were made under the circumstances--sums it up best. I think that David's intent and Lambone's questions are all fair, but no matter how much you can glean from studying the past with a clearer view of the facts as they unfolded, the next time around you are still left with decision making under uncertainty. Those of us who have been through the real time experience and seen the both the tragic and the happy endings have probably grown weary of second-guessing after we have helplessly or hopefully watched the dice tumble to the final outcome.

The second issue is the nature of climbing, personal responsibility, and the role of an organized rescue team. Here the laws of nature are not the issue. The issue is which rule do you pick. On one hand is the banning of all climbing--you might get hurt. At the other end is climb at your own risk--maybe your friends can get you off. Between these two extremes, most of us (climbers, Park Service, the public) sort of agree on a balance. But this is only a rough balance. .

You cannot begin with "Climbing is Dangerous" and end with "Until it gets seriously dangerous, at which point we make it safe." Climbing is dangerous and the skills needed to stay out of trouble and get out of trouble are as much a part of climbing as crack technique or efficient hauling. I subscribe to John's point of view--but he and I are of the same generation and have the same basic views

The connection between the two issues is the unintended impact of simply asking questions when potential tragedy and uncertainty dance. Second guessing YOSAR's decisions, whether it is David or Lambone, can only lead to a more restrictive balance on what climbers can climb and when. (I want to repeat: David and Lambone are both honorably and reasonably asking valid questions.) This doesn't sound reasonable, but it is the natural outcome of combining uncertainty with shifting responsibility from the climbers who chose to climb to the YOSAR team that is left with the choice to intervene.

So, my advise, take these issues up with the folks at YOSAR. Werner did not get to be an old, experienced climber sitting in an armchair. He knows what he is talking about.

Best, Roger
yo

climber
NOT Fresno
Jan 29, 2005 - 10:47am PT
I don't pretend to know anything of the facts, and I know that an obscene amount of self-introspection takes place within SAR after every operation, successful or not.


Smart post, Roger. I think that post (along with Largo's and Melissa's) shows that a discussion like this veers into a question of the philosophy of climbing, which leads to conclusions that make only individual sense. Conclusions like: There shouldn't even be a SAR; or, a radio might be the last thing to take, because a wall is an escape from contact; or, a team with two bags, two bivi sacks, a tarp and a stove is travelling too HEAVY, and would've summitted a day earlier if not bogged down.


Roger Breedlove

Trad climber
Cleveland Heights, Ohio
Jan 29, 2005 - 11:11am PT
Hey Yo:

I agree with your point completely. It seems to me that some of us, no one in particular, don't work out the consquences of the paths we choose. Without meaning to, we want to change our minds after the low probability event with sever consequences actual occurs.

Climbing the Captain should always include a clear, private understanding that you can actually die, in full sight of everyone, through nothing more than a misunderstood message lost in the wind or a decision that the odds are in your faovr if you go 8 oz. lighter.

Edit: I just reread Melissa's post: I repeated what she has already stated.

Roger
Karl Baba

Trad climber
Yosemite, Ca
Jan 29, 2005 - 11:13am PT
It's also a good thing to keep in mind that Yosar doesn't not exist simply to rescue climbers and that many of their rescues are for hikers and other users. Most climbing rescues are also straightforward.

Pulling folks off El Cap is another story. The weather that came in was far more severe than predicted and, even if in hindsight there might have been a window to pull folks off, you can't be sure.

That element of uncertainty was wisely explained by Roger above...Nice post.

So the other side of this is, if Yosar gets extra bold and 5 guys die on a rescue someday, what will the consequences of that be for Yosar? for regulation of climbers? How will we look back on that and what will the "Could have, Should have" talk be then?

Just food for thought. I agree with Roger that the folks asking questions are reasonable but that the questions, if too loud and too official, could have consequences for climbers.

Peace

karl
WBraun

climber
Jan 29, 2005 - 11:57am PT
I stressed in this thread and in the other one where this discussion was taken place that if one needs to know the full information they need to contact the SAR office. The report posted on the web site may not make sense in some respects (Time lines - chain of events - unanswered questions) that is when inquiry to the proper channels is required.

I’ve been on incidents in the past where I too did not understand some of the timelines and chain of events as they where happening. Even the official reports didn’t make sense. There are events going on in the background that we are unaware of at times, this later, after inquiring through the proper channels, became clear
yo

climber
NOT Fresno
Jan 29, 2005 - 12:05pm PT
Yeah, Roger, part of all us (and it varies in each of us) WANTS stuff to go bad. It's not a death wish, certainly, but we're looking to cut it close, again, to a different degree with each of us. Otherwise we'd give up climbing.


How about when we find ourselves in a jam (no bivy gear, no headlamp, no #4 cam, jammed ropes, storm, off-route, hurt, whatever) and it seems so suddenly clear, in that moment, "How F-ing stupid am I?" And two hours after that, in the bar, it's equally clear how great it all was.


Roger, you can call me Ryan if you really want to. ;)
T2

climber
Cardiff by the sea
Jan 29, 2005 - 12:26pm PT
First I want to let David Nelson know that I and Erik were technically rescued from Never Never Land. I refered to our rescue in my trip report as Octopussy because that is the route we had originated on. (Octopussy joins Never Never Land at pitch 15)

It is very unfortunate for Mariko and Ryoichi that they had not survived through this storm. There is NO ONE to blame for their misfortune but themselves. I say this with the utmost respect to them and anyone close to them. I feel they simply made poor decisions about how to deal with the situation they were in.YOSAR was simply trying everything they could to help get them out.

I was very grateful for YOSAR to help me out of our situation on Never Never Land (Octopussy.)I would have NEVER expected their service. In fact I will go as far to say that I never thought that I would ever need their service. But I'll tell ya "I am grateful for what they did for us." I was freaking hungry and wet, and it would have been days before Erik and I would have been able to get ourselves out of there considering the snow conditions above us.

We as climbers and humans have to accept resposibility for our actions. Even if it means death. Mariko and Ryoichi chose to climb El Cap, there are inheirent risk's involved with climbing the Captain. There should be not one bit of criticism towards YOSAR for trying to help them. Just as Melissa said YOSAR is a gift.Fortunately Erik and I were able to reep the benifits of our gift. Let's not screw that up with speculation or what if's. I don't ever want to have any regulations put on climbing El Cap. Could you imagine the park service saying Nope there is some thunder showers predicted at the end of the week, we are not issuing permitts until this passes. Criticism and education needs to be learned through us as climbers not what YOSAR was trying to do. I have said it before and I'll say it again "Werner, Link, Lober, YOSAR Thank you for being able to get my sorry, soggy, hungry ass out of there."


Tommy T
BigSky

Mountain climber
Big Sky Montana
Jan 29, 2005 - 12:31pm PT
Largo wrote:
The moment you tie in and head up a rock wall, you and partner are just as you came into this world, and just as you will leave it: on your own.
JL

If only more climbers actually believed that when they set off, instead of carrying some courage in their Motorola.

Just read the story about you cracking ribs and putting a hole in your helmet having to piggyback that big guy down Washington Column. The picture was priceless!
j

climber
cali
Jan 29, 2005 - 05:24pm PT
Lambone said:
"I disagree. From what I have read, and what I was told from their friends I don't think the climbing team was unprepared."

You can never be prepared for every eventuality. Thus, the risk (and draw) of climbing. You take steps to mitigate risk, though you can never eliminate it. There will always be unmanageable risk whether it is on a wall, a mountain, or a crag.

Clearly, the team was NOT prepared for the situation which they faced. And so it goes.

Most climbers recognize that some things can not be prepared for, and you may have to pay the piper some day.
Ed Hartouni

Trad climber
Livermore, CA
Jan 29, 2005 - 07:16pm PT
This is a very emotional topic for me, as I am extremely fatigued...

Lambone: "How many people have done the Nose without a portaledge and rainfly in the past? Were they all unprepared too?"

Undoubtly many, in my plans I would go without too. Unprepared? yep, guilty. The point is that you cannot assess the risk by a historical analysis, two shuttle accidents have taught that bitter lesson, and countless climbing tragedies. You roll the dice, the dice don't remember the past.

Lambone: "Second, experience: I am not as sure about this, but I do know one thing. I have allways heard the mantra..."do a greade V befor eyou do the Captain." Well, this team climbed a grade 5 before going up on the Nose. Albeit an easy one...the SFWC. "

You cannot seriously claim that doing one grade V in the Valley prepares you for all the possible problems. It doesn't come close. Can you pull it off? yes, it is done often.

Lambone: "These two people were given advice from experienced friends in Camp 4 that they were ready to go for it..."

This does not absolve them of the responsibility, and it does not indicate what their level of experience truely was.

Lambone: "Does this mean they were unprepared, no...I don't thinks so."

I repectfully disagree. But I must say though "there but for the grace of God go I".
nature

climber
Flagstaff, AZ
Jan 29, 2005 - 08:20pm PT
I'm scared to dip my toe in this pond. I've read every post above in detail. I did the same with the posts that sprouted shortly after. I gobbled up the R&I article (which Pete did a fantastic job with). This is incredibly worthy stuff. Please don't stop (even though it's bordering on folks getting "angry" from my armchair perspective).

I don't understand the inner workings of YOSAR enough to understand how times might get messed up on reports, etc., but intuitively it seems that when push comes to shove it's difficult to remember "everything". They do their job the best they can (period). To this, there should be no doubt.

Some excellent points have been made (and reinforced for me, personally).

1) expect nothing from YOSAR - be grateful if they save your butt.
2) Melissa made the point well, and others followed in their own words. It's up to you to be prepared. But there is an excellent point made in that if you are over prepared (whatever that really means), maybe it slows you to the point that you hose yourself. Dean runs up EC with nothing - is he over or underprepared (rhetorical Q, really)? What does "being prepared" truly mean?
3) Sounds like the Japanese party made some errors in judgement. That sucks, but as pointed out above, we walk that line for a reason. We want to have to make those calls - it's part of why we climb.
4) keeping this between us strikes me a prudent course of action - regulation is around the corner if fingers get pointed.

This discussion is helpful because it helps me look in hindsight at my trips up the Captain - it makes me ask questions of myself as if I was prepared enough in the past. It's making me think a bit harder about soloing in Zion (during winter). I just wish everyone could/would do the same.

I think the point made that you'd be better off with mountaineering experience VS a grade five before trying EC is excellent. I got my ass kicked on my first EC (and wall) route - bad weather but we knew how to tough it out - climbing on Rainer, etc. helped me tough it out.

Maybe what concerns me more through all of this is that there is a growing attitude that climbing EC isn't that big of a deal - follow the better way and it's a piece of cake.

stealing a line from above, those are my two cents and yeah, you got change coming.
WBraun

climber
Jan 29, 2005 - 08:24pm PT
Times get logged by command post dispatch or Park dispatch according.
nature

climber
Flagstaff, AZ
Jan 29, 2005 - 08:48pm PT
Werner, not that I see it truly mattering (in the grand scheme of things) but Lambone seems pretty adament that the times are messed up. There are not many that would stand up and argue with you the way he has unless they were pretty sure of themselves. That speaks a volume or two for me (maybe a horrible assumption on my part). Perhaps this is just a really touchy subject and it sets folks of in a way they normally wouldn't.

He obviously was on the ground during the SAR. I'm sure he cared about what was going on as the rest of you guys. Again, not that it matters but I find it interesting the exchange between you two.

I'll cut my penny in six pieces and leave one of them - that's about all this post of mine was worth I figure....

EDIT: He's (Lambone) a back door man!!! atleast with his post above ;-)
Largo

Sport climber
Venice, Ca
Jan 29, 2005 - 09:12pm PT
After scanning through these posts, I sense there is some confusion per the logic of this thing, which is not uncommon with such emotionally charged issues, at least for me.

In my view, these people died because they went up on a big rock wall and got caught in a bad storm. That's it.

When you try and factor YOSAR into the equation you're no longer talking directly about HOW or WHY folks died, but about other parties efforts to effect the how and the why of it. Trying to place direct responsibility on YOSAR, in any way shape or form, is only possible if YOSAR was doing the climbing in the first instance, and had gotten trapped on the wall during the storm. Otherwise you're saying that climbers are not directly responsible for the consequences of their decisions and their actions, when in fact, these tragic deaths tell us clearly that we are.

JL
WBraun

climber
Jan 29, 2005 - 10:23pm PT
“At the time I was wondering why the PA attempt was not made at first light? This is a question I would like to hear answered.”

Nobody called or yelled for help. Nobody requested any emergency. There was nothing. I already said this (here we go again) in a different thread that me and Lober went down to the meadow at approximately 8:00 am that morning and Lober yelled several times very loudly. Remember now at this time: THERE IS NO ONE ASKING FOR ANY KIND OF ASSISTANCE OF ANY SORT.

About the ice on the ropes that is true. On one past EL CAP rescue the ropes froze solid. We had to prussik out for hundreds of feet to the top. Jugs were not working.
WBraun

climber
Jan 29, 2005 - 11:23pm PT
“Werner is right, the appropriate thing to do would be to make a phone call and go through the proper channels to find out. For me I don't see the need to take it any further than this forum.”

Do you see the pattern here. This is what I already knew days ago when this subject matter came up. I could’ve easily just told you yesterday to take a big flying…..
Now if somebody told you to go across the street to talk to the guy who can give you everything you need and you don’t. Instead you keep thinking your going to figure it out by yourself.. Indirect method.

A good horse runs at the sight of the whip.
A bad horse needs to be (and, yes, you guessed it) continually whipped just to get going.

I’m not defending YOSAR in my posts here. Why? There is nothing to defend.
Ed Hartouni

Trad climber
Livermore, CA
Jan 30, 2005 - 02:11am PT
Lambone: "... jeeze dude, relax."

This is not a casual topic, you have raised some serious questions and have been persistent in getting answers on a difficult subject. Werner has tried to address your questions with the facts as they are known.

Lambone:"$110k was spent and two people didn't make it. Public has a right to ask questions."

This line of reasoning will eventually shut off all informal communication between the SAR community and the climbing community. Are you saying that the money was ill spent by YOSAR? Please try to imagine what those words mean to someone reading them.

Lambone:"I am asking how a professional rescue team is supposed to operate."

As you know, rescues are not scripted and rehersed activities. Every rescue is different. The post-operation debrief is an important aspect of evaluating the efficacy of the operation. Werner has been astonishingly helpful in providing information on this evaluation.

Not everyone who gets into trouble can be saved, even if they are less than a mile away from safety, even when the intevening distance puts them in sight of everyone. Questioning YOSAR's professionalism is extreme.

WBraun

climber
Jan 30, 2005 - 02:36am PT
I thought about not posting this: …But…. Oh well what the hell.

“jeeze dude, relax. I thought you were all about zen and sh#t...”

Your lucky I’m not otherwise I would’ve cracked some board over your thick head.

Do we see the pattern here....


WBraun

climber
Jan 30, 2005 - 02:58pm PT
Board of inquiry always goes to the proper source. Supertopo NOT the proper source.

The Lambone board of inquiry: ” For me I don't see the need to take it any further than this forum.”
WBraun

climber
Jan 30, 2005 - 06:05pm PT
Lambone said:

I was this close to asking Lober straight to his face in front of the news camera why he waited so long to make the call to go for the Japanese, but I resisted out of respect for him. So now, 4 months later someone thought they start this thread, and I thought I'd share information...which is more then you are doing.

If you felt like that then I don’t know what stopped you. That’s got nothing to do with respect! You want information you go to the source. I’m NOT the source. You go to the IC (incident commander) ask him. There’s a command structure in place. You go to those guys for the kind of questions you have. I have to do the same. Not me, or SuperTopo. I suggested that to David Nelson and he did.

If your wondering why I’m not going to the source for you, its not how its done.
You have certain questions that need to be answered and not altered thru a second party. I might screw up the information during the transfer. That’s why I said its not my job.

This thread is only as David said: “A Retrospective Analysis” It’s not the source.
Lg

Trad climber
NorCaL
Jan 30, 2005 - 07:45pm PT
Clueless offered his opinion:

"1. The reason those climbers died is because they went up there on their own doing and got caught in a strom and made a bad decision to stay at Camp 6.

2. The reason they were not saved is because YOSAR was too hesitant to initiate a rescue, and let critical hours squander while deciding wether to go or not. "

Hmm, when you say you are not trying to place responsibility, it sure looks like it here. Clearly you are also confused because apparently you think that SAR is 50% responsible for your well-being.

You have all the information you need yet you accuse others of holding back, not participating, etc. OPEN your eyes, just because you were in the meadow at the time you feel like you have some special right to be accusatory. When in fact, you should be ashamed. For heaven's sake this stuff has been hashed out months ago already...the mind believes what the mind wants to believe. My point? You said earlier, "I don't know and it's not my place to say. All I have are questions." Hmm well you sure seem content to offer your two opinions above after saying it's not your place.

To conclude, I adorn you with the "Unclear On the Concept" award because of your belief that Mariko and Ryoichi did NOT want to be rescued because they started climbing through the storm?!? All I can do is shake my head with that one. I believe they tried to move higher because they knew a rescue will be attempted thus, trying to bring the gap a little closer with the team coming down from the rim.

>whew< had to get that off my chest...and I'm usually all zen-like and sh*t!

Lg

Largo

Sport climber
Venice, Ca
Jan 30, 2005 - 10:02pm PT
Interesting question: When is YOSAR supposed to go after it? And should they initiate a rescue, even if assistance is not asked for? IOW, should they proactively start swooping in on anyone they think needs help, for the well being of climbers who don't know enough to ask for help?

YOSAR is a professional outfit, yes. But the above sounds perilously close to "policing" the cliffside, and in fact, when response times and so forth are mentioned, the police model is certainly in play.

Statistics state clearly that a certain amount of folks are going to die climbing El Cap in any given decade. If we start insisting that those deaths have to be eliminated by a hypervigilant, proactive rescue team, what do you think will be lost in the bargain, in terms of freedom?

JL
Southern Man

climber
Jan 31, 2005 - 10:25am PT
I hesitate to break the sweet flow of dialogue that is taking place here BUT I have a slightly different question for this "Retrospective Analysis". After reading the R&I article, what was up with the japanese climbing duo and their haul bag? The article made it sound like the bag somehow fell, loaded on the harness of Mariko, and he had to cut it loose. I believe Lober state that when that happened, it was all pretty much over for our japanese friends. To me, cutting it loose was a key mistake. To my way of thinking, the only explanation for cutting your haul bag loose, would be if you thought you were going to make it to the top and for some reason you couldn't rap to get it unstuck. Why would you cut the line to your only means of survival, when there was only talk of a rescue. For me to cut the haul bag loose in those conditions, someone from YOSAR would have to be rapping down to me. Also, in an earlier thread, mention was made about Mariko and his wife having friends with them in the valley during their climbing trip. Where were they during the SAR? Did they ever call YOSAR to alert them to the plight of their friends? Are they the ones who called out over the PA system or was it someone else? Lastly, in the R&I article, someone with incredable forsight, saw the storm coming in, didn't wait for YOSAR, hiked to the top of El Cap and dropped a line to his girlfriend and her climbing partner so they could jug up. Too bad no one else in C4 had similar forsight, eh. And before you say it, it wasn't the boyfriends job either. Peace Out!
Lambone

Ice climber
Ashland, Or
Jan 31, 2005 - 11:51am PT
well that's alot of questions, I can only really answer one of them. The guy who called up in the PA name pronounced K-gee(sp?) was a fellow they met in Camp 4. He had helped them prepare for the big wall and new the most about what equipment and experience they had. Nice guy.
ricardo

Gym climber
San Francisco, CA
Jan 31, 2005 - 12:11pm PT
Lambone ..

.. after reading all these posts ... i have to echo what werner is saying .. why dont you call the YOSAR office and get the official report.

.. dont you think that if yosar was requried to prevent all deaths on el cap it would diminish the experience of climbing it .. i know that most big wall climbers definately get something out of the risk of climbing a big wall like el cap.


    ricardo
Largo

Sport climber
Venice, Ca
Jan 31, 2005 - 12:14pm PT
There's no simple answers here--that's for sure.

Lambone wrote: "Which risk would you rather they take, be hypervigilant and intervine with the risk that the climbing team does not need assistance, or conservitive as people slowly freeze to death?"

This still works off the idea that YOSAR is responsibility for the well being of El Cap climbers, at least once things sart getting grave. The thorny bit here is that there might someday be a sort of "acceptable epic" check list to which all parties must conform. Meaning the caliber of your adventure will be monitored by the authorties. If your adventure starts miving off the charts, you'll get plucked off the cliffside like it or not--for your own good and to forestall bad PR on climbing in general and the authorities in particular.

I dunno . . . The cost of freedom is that some folks are going to die. The cost for a safety net is 100K every time YOSAR kick starts the chopper, and a risk criteria to which climbers must conform.

JL
yo

climber
NOT Fresno
Jan 31, 2005 - 12:34pm PT
Yup.

If it comes down to SAR being unsure for some critical amount of time which parties are where on the wall, the easy solution (for SAR, i.e. NPS) is to institute a registration system. And why not charge five bucks for that. And then when you go in to get a permit and they say, "How many in the party?" and you say, "One, I'm soloing x death route" they go, "Whoa, easy, maybe you should show us a resume first. And your bag too, we'll have to make sure you have the requisite gear: ledge, fly, tent, tarp, stove, gore-tex undies, clamming boots..."
Lambone

Ice climber
Ashland, Or
Jan 31, 2005 - 12:42pm PT
curious, is the "Friends of YOSAR" report posted in that link above NOT the official report?

you guys are right, I don't want to see that happen either.
Lambone

Ice climber
Ashland, Or
Jan 31, 2005 - 12:52pm PT
goddamit I'm not asking for any of that. would you read what I wrote a little closer.
David Nelson

climber
San Francisco
Topic Author's Reply - Feb 1, 2005 - 01:06pm PT
Someone said that it is OK for David and Lambone to be asking questions. Actually, I was asking questions about the decisions the Japanese team made regarding equipment, and honestly never thought that the actions of YOSAR needed our analysis. I won't say that is out of bounds, but I had not thought of it. I was looking for input from more experienced climbers (I have been climbing for 33 years, but have only done two big walls) regarding things like bivi bags, communications, ground contact party, etc.

Regarding climbing the Captain without a portaledge, doing that in June is one thing, doing that in late October is a very different decision tree. If you get hit with a storm in June, the likelihood that you will have cold rain or snow for more than a day is low. You need to be prepared for cold and for rain, but I doubt most of us are prepared for three days of snow. In October, however, you need to expect to have sub-freezing weather for a week straight and then some. You need to be prepared for cold rain one day that freezes all your ropes a day later. You need to be prepared with enough warm weather gear and waterproofing (portaledge with a fly that is not defective, bivi bag, synthetic bag) to last out days of inability to climb because of bad weather/frozen ropes. I think climbing El Cap in October without a portaledge, if you are not doing the climb in a day, is a very real risk.

How many think that both a portalege with fly and a bivi bag are necessary for El Cap or HD in June?
Lambone

Ice climber
Ashland, Or
Feb 1, 2005 - 10:16pm PT
I agree with you David, but...I would do the Nose with no ledge any time of year. Although I'd probly try to get up it in three days, and rap if the weather got sketch.
T2

climber
Cardiff by the sea
Feb 2, 2005 - 10:32am PT
I have voiced my opion on this subject in regards to the party in question. "I feel that they made poor decisions" Why didn't they rap when shitt started to go bad? I mean you can be on the ground from anywhere on the nose in a matter of hours. I for one would not drag a ledge up the nose anytime of the year. But I would not spend any time in a storm anywhere on the route. Sunday morning waking up at camp 6 in the rain, I would be out of there headed for coffee in the lodge. Why didn't they rap?

Tommy T
Southern Man

climber
Feb 2, 2005 - 11:45am PT
T2:
My guess is that they were pretty new to the Big Wall game (maybe fairly new event to climbing in general) and didn't know how easy it was to rap the route. Did they have two ropes to rap with? Was the rope that was cut with the haul bag attached a third (static) rope or only a second rope?
rockermike

Mountain climber
Berkeley
Feb 2, 2005 - 11:51am PT
Rap route?
I've thought about the same thing. But 20 plus raps, rain, sleet, wind. No rain gear. You get soaked to the bone. You don't know exactly where the rap route goes... One stuck rap rope and you're screwed.

In retrospect it seems obvious best choice but if I was there in that situation I'm not sure what decision I'd make. What do other people think?

As to hauling a ledge, I don't really see much advantage. But bomb proof shelter yes. (I've considered taking my double ledge fly but not the ledge itself. You certainly could get yourself good and covered up with a fly. Not comfortable but I would think fairly secure and dry-ish)

Another thought I've had; Chris Mac has a good intro to big wall weather in the intro to his big wall book, but its in English. (I'm not saying this in jest) Maybe it should be printed in Japanese also. Two weather related disasters on El Cap with Japanese climbers and I'll bet neither party could read the warnings. - anyway, just a thought.
Lambone

Ice climber
Ashland, Or
Feb 2, 2005 - 12:40pm PT
Being on Camp 6 it would be a tough call wether to rap the route or just climb to the top in the rain, it's only 4 pitches. If you short-fixed it you could eliminat freezing at a belay for two long and be on top in a couple of hours.

mellpat

Big Wall climber
Sweden
Feb 2, 2005 - 01:18pm PT
Lambone:
I would have chosen neither - if the Nose was my first wall of that stature. I would have choosen to stay in Camp 6, in the hope of completing the route when conditions had improved, in one or two days hopefully. Without rain gear there would not be much of a choice anyways. Incidentally, I myself would never have ventured on to a wall of that size without rain gear, in addition to a bivi sack and sleeping gear.

If the weather did not improve sufficiently to move, I would stay put and await rescue. Keeping the running water and the cold away as best as possible.

The guru and sometimes boss of the Swedish High Mountain Rescue acted like this four years ago in Sweden and survived. After three nights at an exposed bivouac site in bad weather, he and his partner were too fatigued to continue. However, the first helicopter at the scene crashed when the rotor hit the wall and the crew (3) was killed. Probably pilot error, since the site was not that difficult to reach. The pilot had been awakened in the middle of the night, after one hour of sleep only.
Southern Man

climber
Feb 2, 2005 - 01:26pm PT
mellpat:
You must not have read much of this thread or followed the events of this tragety. They had rain gear, had bivy bags, had synthetic sleeping bags, had a stove, had a rain tarp.
Lambone

Ice climber
Ashland, Or
Feb 2, 2005 - 01:34pm PT
I have spent alot of time aid climbing in the rain, snow and rain/snow up in the Washington Cascades. If you just keep moving and don't stop until you reach the top then it's not that bad. Of course if you are trying to climb through a waterfall then it gets bad pretty quickly.
mellpat

Big Wall climber
Sweden
Feb 2, 2005 - 01:45pm PT
Southern Man:

I have read it all. Your understanding of rain gear probably differs from mine. I mean jacket (with hood) and trousers, or an overall.

http://www.friendsofyosar.org/rescues/missions/10-19-04_Nose.html
Melissa

Big Wall climber
oakland, ca
Feb 2, 2005 - 01:57pm PT
"I have spent alot of time aid climbing in the rain, snow and rain/snow up in the Washington Cascades. If you just keep moving and don't stop until you reach the top then it's not that bad. Of course if you are trying to climb through a waterfall then it gets bad pretty quickly"

I think that's the strategy that cost both the recently deceased Japanese team and the team that died on the summit bolt ladder 20 years ago their lives.

I don't know what caliber of a climber you'd have to be to negotiate the somewhat run out "5.5" from the bolts to the summit tree in that kind of weather?

I know that it's highly improbable I'd be able to onsight the East Ledges or find my way across the summit slabs to get onto the Falls Trail in a white out.

The rap route is very straightforward by comparisson. At a minimum, there are less runoff-exposed ledges a short distance below.

If I was not familiar enough with the area to realize that it can get so ugly on top, I might have chosen to go up too if I was so close to the summit.
Lambone

Ice climber
Ashland, Or
Feb 2, 2005 - 02:27pm PT
"I think that's the strategy that cost both the recently deceased Japanese team and..."

Yeah, but they had been sitting on a ledge freezing for three days and were probly nearly hypothermic when they started climbing. They would have been better off blasting for it on Sunday, before it had even started snowing.

but whatever, hindsight is allways 20/20 right...

I don't think you can really call 25 rappels with a haulbag straightforward.
yo

climber
NOT Fresno
Feb 2, 2005 - 02:42pm PT
No, you can't. I'm sorry, but if you're trying to rap from Camp 6 with a bag in a growing storm, you're f*#ked.

I'm not entirely sure it matters what condition you're in when you go for it--the right (or wrong, I guess) conditions can f*#k you over in no time. The two Japanese parties and Joe Crowe on Zodiac would be a few of many examples.


It's seems like a party needs to decide what they are. If they're fast and light they can't bring all that sh#t and they need to be competent enough to do the climbing in crappy conditions, and fast. Or retreat, also fast. And if they're prepared they better hole up and wait it out.
Melissa

Big Wall climber
oakland, ca
Feb 2, 2005 - 02:52pm PT
I sure can and will call it "straightforward by comparison" (to belaying in a waterfall, freeing iced over slabs, and onsighting the East Ledges in a white out with the same pig and then some in tow).

FWIW, the Glowering Spot ledge is about two raps below, if memory serves. When we were up there in a much less severe rain storm, the Glowering Spot was actually staying dry while Camp 6 was flowing. Camp 5, one more pitch down, was bigger than the GS and getting run off, but not as bad as Camp 6. This storm may have been so much worse than the one I was in that all bets were off on some of the more protected places too. Nonetheless, rapping to a better spot, if one exists, doesn't necessarily mean heading to the the ground in a push. Supposedly the lower part of the route gets even less run off, although I have not seen this with my own eyes.

I'm writing this because when we were up there in the rain, we knew about others getting hosed on Camp 6 and chose to stay put for that reason (although the chances of things getting equivalently ugly for us in the middle of the summer were slim). I don't want to criticize the Japanese team (since I'll never know the details of their ordeal)...just offer up some beta for someone else considering the same route and get feedback from others who know the route better than I do. A lot of the routes on El Cap slab out at the top and therefore are ugliest near the summit. If bad weather is coming, perhaps, at least for the slower folks like myself, the safer choice is to wait it out a bit lower out of major watercourses if possible?
Southern Man

climber
Feb 2, 2005 - 03:59pm PT
As in so many tragic events, it isn't one single mistake or bad decision that ultimately leads to ruin. The Japanese duo were climbing slowly, had minimum bad weather gear, climbed during the time of year when multi-day pacific storms are not uncommon, didn't have much big wall experience, and didn't have a way of communicating with folks on the ground. I think yo makes a good point: the climbing party needs to decide their strategy for the accent and plan accordingly (light and fast OR slower and heavier). Our departed Japanese friends were fairly light and fairly slow, a bad combination when a pacific blast hits.
Lambone

Ice climber
Ashland, Or
Feb 2, 2005 - 04:12pm PT
Mellisa, I agree with you that rappeling a few pitches below Camp 6 out of the run-off would have been better then waiting it out at Camp 6. However I still argue that attempting to rappel the entire face in that storm would not have been any safer then going up over the top. At least on the top they could have found shelter and maybe even built a fire, at the very least be able to walk around and generate body heat. Plus who says you have to go down the East Ledges, ditch your haulbag and run down the Falls trail.

Assuming that they knew any of this is assuming too much. But if some poor bastard reads this an ends up getting stuck in a similar situation, at least they have thought about options, and that makes what we have written here worth something.
cheers

ricardo

Gym climber
San Francisco, CA
Feb 2, 2005 - 04:19pm PT
I think we're all basically saying the same thing ..

you need to have a plan .. and you need know what your options are.

Seems to me like the japanese team lacked both... and the means to get enough information to form a plan (if they had a radio they could have gotten the info that the storm was going to obliterate them) ..

.. if i thought my life was in danger .. and i was rapping 24+ pitches in a storm, i'm pretty sure i'd cut the pig loose and just let it fly to the bottom.

    ricardo
Southern Man

climber
Feb 2, 2005 - 04:40pm PT
as ricardo said, give the pig wings to fly. And I agree that the discussion should make all of us a little more aware of the obvious and not so obvious dangers/options.
yo

climber
NOT Fresno
Feb 2, 2005 - 04:53pm PT
You cut the pig loose, get your ropes caught, and are forced to bivy without your gear. See ya.


It just goes round and round. You never know when acting smart will kill you.
Lambone

Ice climber
Ashland, Or
Feb 2, 2005 - 05:02pm PT
".. if i thought my life was in danger .. and i was rapping 24+ pitches in a storm, i'm pretty sure i'd cut the pig loose and just let it fly to the bottom.

    ricardo"

I agree with Yo, cutting you pigs loose before you are standing on flat ground would be a major mistake. Like he said, what happens when you ropes get stuck, or it gets dark and you are going into hypothermia, you gett off route? What do you do now that you have NO equipment!?

Getting down a major bigwall face often can take more then one day for whatever reason, you need the option to bivi and be able to survive. Cut the bags loose and you have just f*#ked yourself.

I talked to a guy who spent three epic days trying to rap off the NA wall in a mid winter storm. He would tell you with authority that you'd be a moron to cut your bags loose.
Brian in SLC

Social climber
Salt Lake City, UT
Feb 2, 2005 - 05:48pm PT
At the risk of gettin' some of this on me...

Lambone posted, "I am thankful that Yosemite is unlike two other National Parks which are popular climbing destinations...Mt Rainier, and Grand Teton NP. Places where you have to wait in line for a permit and pay to climb. I do hope it never ends up that way, but I am fearfull it will eventualy."

Grand Teton National Park requires a permit only for camping, and not for climbing (which wasn't the case in years past). They (ahem) weathered a lawsuit involving rescue, which, is kind of interesting to ponder (and hooray for the outcome, really). Some parallels perhaps.

See below.

Brian in SLC

WYOMING NATIONAL PARK FATALITY IMMUNITY FOR FAILED RESCUE
JOHNSON v. UNITED STATES

949 F.2d 332 (Cir. 10th 1991)
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
November 13, 1991

KEYWORDS: Wyoming, national park, hiking, rescue, discretionary function, immunity.

CASE SYNOPSIS: Plaintiff's decedent died during a hiking trip into defendant's national park. The trial court granted summary judgment to defendant. In the absence of laws, regulations, or policies, the appeals court found that regulation of climbing was a matter of choice and judgment. Further, the appeals court found climbing regulation in the park was based upon economic, political, and social policy considerations. Specifically, regulation of backcountry climbing required the site superintendent to balance visitor safety against the need to conserve manpower and economic resources. Similarly, the appeals court found that the scope and availability of search and rescue missions were left to the discretion of rangers to make independent policy decisions. The appeals court, therefore, found that discretionary function immunity applied to plaintiff's allegations of negligence against defendant. Accordingly, the appeals court affirmed the judgment of the district court in favor of defendant.

***

In this case, plaintiff Hugh B. Johnson, Jr. brought this action alleging that the wrongful death of Ben Johnson was caused by the negligence of the National Park Service in failing to undertake the rescue of decedent. The facts of the case were as follows:

On June 28, 1987, decedent, Ben Johnson, and three companions, Robin Macal, Daniel Feikin and David Wechner, hiked to the summit of Buck Mountain in Grand Teton National Park. Buck Mountain is the seventh highest peak in the Teton Range, rising to an elevation of 11,938 feet above sea level and 5,729 feet (approximately one mile) above the valley floor.

Macal and Wechner had acquired the necessary climbing permit from the Jenny Lake Ranger Station the previous afternoon. The four climbers had varying degrees of experience. Wechner was the designated leader of the party. Johnson was the least experienced, with no technical climbing experience whatsoever. Johnson and his companions began their ascent at approximately 8:00 a.m. via Buck Mountain's east ridge, a nontechnical route.

The four climbers reached the summit at different times between 9:00 and 10:30 a.m.

After gathering at the summit, the group descended in pairs, at different times, via the east face, a nontechnical route regarded as relatively easy. The two most experienced climbers, Macal and Wechner, descended first. They reached Timberline Lake at approximately 12:00 noon, the entire descent taking approximately fifteen minutes. Although Johnson and Feikin began their descent along the east face shortly thereafter, they soon strayed south, entering more difficult and technical terrain. Unable to find their way back to the easier route, Johnson and Feikin attempted to descend the southern route. At some point, however, Feikin resolved he could go no further and remained on a ledge where he was in visual contact with Macal and Wechner waiting at Timberline Lake. Johnson, on the other hand, decided to continue his descent. After leaving the summit, Johnson was in occasional voice contact, but never in visual contact with Macal and Wechner.

At approximately 2:30 p.m. Macal and Wechner decided to summon help from the Park Rangers. Macal ran from Timberline Lake to the trailhead where he retrieved his vehicle and drove to the Moose Visitor's Center. Arriving at the visitor's center at approximately 4:30 p.m., he approached Ranger James Springer and informed him that Johnson and Feikin were off course and stuck, but that he believed there was a ranger in the area. At this point Macal was unaware, and therefore unable to report, that at approximately 3:15 p.m. Johnson had fallen on a hard snowslope, crashed into rocks and sustained a serious head injury and lacerations. Upon receiving Macal's information, Springer made radio contact with Ranger Randy Harrington, who had been in the vicinity of Buck Mountain, to determine whether he knew of any climbers in distress. Ranger Harrington reported that he had encountered four climbers descending Buck Mountain and that they were walking through Death Canyon. After talking with Harrington, Ranger Springer told Macal he should return to Whitegrass Trailhead to wait for his companions.

Macal returned to the trailhead and remained in the area until approximately 8:45 p.m. when Wechner arrived from Timberline Lake. After Wechner reported he had not seen Johnson and that Feikin was still stranded on the ledge, Macal realized the communication between Rangers Springer and Harrington had been erroneous. The four climbers Ranger Harrington reported seeing were Jeff McMullen, Anne Petroni, Macal and Wechner. Ranger Harrington mistakenly assumed that McMullen and Petroni were part of the Wechner group.

Wechner and Macal then drove to the Moose Visitor's Center where they told Ranger Northrup about the previous miscommunication. They informed him Feikin had been on the same ledge for over four hours and Johnson had not been seen since earlier in the day. Both Wechner and Macal were still unaware that Johnson was injured. Northrup contacted Ranger Peter Armington, the Jenny Lake District search and rescue (SAR) coordinator.

Ranger Armington consulted with his SAR team concerning a possible rescue effort. The SAR team is a group of experienced climbing rangers, which to the extent practicable patrols the rugged backcountry climbing terrain. In June 1987 there were eighteen search and rescue rangers in the Jenny Lake Subdistrict. At approximately 9:30 p.m., Armington decided to send climbing rangers Harrington and Larsen to Buck Mountain to retrieve Feikin from the ledge and to look for Johnson. The rangers reached Feikin in the early morning hours, but were unable to locate Johnson. A helicopter search was initiated at first light, 6:15 a.m. Johnson's body was located approximately twenty minutes later in a melt pool near Timberline Lake. Johnson had died from hypothermia at approximately 10:30 p.m. the previous night.

Plaintiff Johnson alleged that "Ben Johnson would not have died but for the Park Service's negligent failure to: (1) adequately regulate recreational climbing activity in Grand Teton National Park; (2) initiate a rescue effort after Macal's initial report; and (3) conduct a reasonable rescue effort after Macal's second report." In response, the United States maintained that Johnson's action was "jurisdictionally barred by the discretionary function exception to the FTCA, 28 U.S.C. 2680(a)." In the alternative, the United States contended that the National Park Service "had no legal duty to rescue Ben Johnson." The federal district court agreed that no legal duty existed herein and granted summary judgment to the United States. Johnson appealed.

In the opinion of the appeals court, the specific issue was whether the district court had erred in no determining "the discretionary function exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 2680(a), applies to the undisputed facts of this case." The appeals court described the discretionary function exception to the FTCA as follows:

The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) authorizes civil suits against the United States for money damages for injury or loss of property, or personal injury caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred. 28 U.S.C. 1346(b).

This broad waiver of sovereign immunity is limited, however, by the discretionary function exception, which prohibits any claim against the United States based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused. The discretionary function exception marks the boundary between Congress' willingness to impose tort liability upon the United States and its desire to protect certain governmental activities from exposure to suit by private individuals. Application of this exception is therefore a threshold issue ‑ a jurisdictional issue which precedes any negligence analysis.

We first consider whether the challenged action is a matter of choice for the acting employee. If a statute, regulation, or policy prescribes a specific course of conduct, then an employee must adhere to the directive and no discretion is involved. If, however, the challenged action is discretionary, we must then determine whether it is of the kind Congress intended to shield through the exception... Congress intended to shield only those governmental decisions based on considerations of public policy ‑ decisions grounded in social, economic and political policy. Accordingly, the discretionary function exception will not bar a negligence claim if the government's policy leaves no room for an official to exercise policy judgment in performing a given act, or if the act simply does not involve the exercise of such judgment.

Accordingly, the appeals court found the specific issue in this instance was "whether the National Park Service's climbing regulation and rescue decisions in Grand Teton National Park are shielded from liability" by the discretionary function exception to the FTCA.

On appeal, Johnson argued that the Park Service decisions "regarding the nature and extent of mountain climbing regulations in Grand Teton National Park... not to require additional warnings regarding the potential danger of mountain climbing, not to require safety equipment use, not to test the competency of each mountain climber, and not to 'clear' the mountains of all climbers before dark... do not invoke the discretionary function exception."

As described by the appeals court, the following "broad statutory/regulatory framework" governing "Park Service decisions regarding climbing regulation" involved "an exercise of judgment or choice," thus satisfying the first requirement of an immune discretionary function.

By statute, the Park Service is directed to promote and regulate the use of national parks by such means and measures as conform to the fundamental purpose of the said parks which purpose is to conserve the scenery and the natural and historic objects and the wild life therein and to provide for the enjoyment of the same in such manner and by such means as will leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations.

16 U.S.C. 1 (1988)
Grand Teton National Park is to be administered in accordance with this general mandate. According to the affidavit of Jack Stark, Superintendent, Grand Teton National Park, no federal statutes or regulations apply to the National Park Service or to Grand Teton National Park which specify how mountain climbing should be regulated. The Park Service has never promulgated a formal mountain climbing policy or climbing regulations. The Park does, however, require climbers to obtain a permit before departing on a climb. The purpose of the permit system is to educate climbers via face‑to‑face ranger contact.

When a permit is requested, rangers attempt to evaluate the climbers' capabilities, and suggest alternative climbs if appropriate. Rangers have no authority, however, to prohibit climbers from taking a particular route.

No statute, regulation, or policy specifically prescribes a course of action for the National Park Service to follow. Decisions as to the extent or nature of mountain climbing regulation are truly the product of the Park Service's independent judgment ‑ they are discretionary.

Johnson, however, argued that these regulatory decisions failed to satisfy the second requirement for an immune discretionary function because "they do not implicate social, economic, or political policy considerations." The appeals court rejected this argument.

To the contrary, Superintendent Stark asserts that each of Plaintiff's contentions have been considered, but were rejected for the following social and economic policy reasons: (1) the inherent dangers of mountain climbing are patently obvious; (2) both manpower and economic resources should be conserved to preserve availability during emergency situations; (3) it would be impractical if not impossible to test competency, monitor equipment use, or "clear" the mountain given the limited available manpower and economic resources; and (4) many Park visitors value backcountry climbing as one of the few experiences free from government regulation or interference.

Plaintiff has presented no evidence to dispute Superintendent Stark's assertions.

We conclude that decisions if, when and how to regulate mountain climbing in Grand Teton National Park go to the essence of the Park Service's judgment in maintaining the Park according to the broad statutory directive. By their very nature, these decisions involve balancing competing policy considerations pertaining to visitor safety, resource availability, and the appropriate degree of governmental interference in recreational activity.

As a result, the appeals court concluded that "the Park Service's actions, insofar as they relate to the regulation of mountain climbing in Grand Teton National Park, are therefore shielded from judicial review by the discretionary function exception."

The appeals court also rejected Johnson's argument that his "failure to warn claim should be analyzed separately from the alleged failure to adequately regulate mountain climbing."
Link

Trad climber
Yosemite, CA
Feb 3, 2005 - 04:26pm PT
My apologies for not posting to this thread (and others) sooner. I try to serve as an info source for local climbing news, somewhat of a horses mouth on NPS climbing issues, but I’ve been absent from many discussions recently. I planned to write a summary of what happened in this accident, what we could learn, etc. (as I’ve done in the past), but unfortunately I left the valley before I had time, and I’ve been distracted ever since.

Werner, good info, as always. I’m glad to see the winter hasn’t made you any more long winded :)

As others have pointed out, there are two things to look at: what Ryugo and Yamanoto could have done differently to survive the storm, and what the NPS could have done differently to save their lives. As far as this forum is concerned, the first of these (what they could have done to survive) is the more important. What the NPS could have done differently is a question for the NPS to debate. I’m not trying to avoid criticism; this just isn’t the place to debate the rescue details. That being said, I will clarify a few things about the rescue for those who are interested.

Lambone, you’ve asked countless times “why didn’t the NPS do something sooner?” It’s a completely valid question, but I’m surprised you’re still looking for an answer. I don’t mean to start a time-line debate, but it’s important for you to understand what happened and why.

The rain started early Sunday morning, and a full rescue effort was under way by Tuesday afternoon (myself and two others breaking trail to the summit while dozens of others geared up to follow). At that same time, late on Tuesday afternoon, Ryugo and Yamanoto likely died. We were too late, by a factor of days, not hours.

Given the how long it takes for an equipped rescue team to reach the summit in blizzard conditions, the NPS would have had to launch a full rescue attempt by mid Monday in order to (maybe) reach Ryugo and Yamanoto by Tuesday afternoon. Of course in hindsight we all wish this had happened, but at the time it didn’t make sense. Few would argue the NPS should launch a full rescue for every big wall party that spends a day and a half in a storm, but in this case that’s what we should have done to save their lives.

So, without a request for help, when should the NPS initiate a rescue? When it’s clear a rescue is needed? What if that’s too late? Unfortunately there are no easy answers. Yes Lambone, as you saw, it was clear on Tuesday that Ryugo and Yamanoto needed help, but by that point there was little we could do to reach them in time. Your frustration that day was justified, as was our own.

As for the first topic, what Ryugo and Yamanoto could have done to survive the storm, here again there is no simple mistake at which to point. They weren’t novices, and they weren’t completely ill equipped. As with most complicated accidents, there are many things they “could have done,” but it’s hard to say which of these they “should have done.” They could have descended at the first sign of bad weather, hauled an expedition porta-ledge, carried cell phones and radios to call for help, or perhaps climbed the route earlier in the season. But should they have done any of these things? That’s a debate we each have to have with ourselves; how safe do we want to be?

I think others have already brought up many of the ways this accident could have been avoided, and I hope we can all learn from these suggestions.

See you all in the spring,
-Link
Link

Trad climber
Yosemite, CA
Feb 3, 2005 - 04:43pm PT


As long as I'm posting, here's something I wrote last month that some of you might enjoy:






We’ve lost the trail again. Wet snow stings my face as I post hole back to the last piece of flagging. Visibility is dropping, and my pink marker is already out of site just a hundred feet back. There, found it. Whipping in the wind, it’s tied to a snag where the trail leaves some trees. Ok, start over, where does it go from here… come on, think, I was just here a week ago sweating in the sun.

The radio strapped to my chest squawks something about the team on the Nose, and I make out Brandon’s voice through the static. “It’s totally socked in. Our last view was a hour ago, and they hadn’t moved.” He must be eyeing the face from below, trying to catch a glimpse through the storm.

They’re dead, they’ve got to be, there’s no way, not in this. We need to move faster. What about the other parties, the team on Salathe, those guys over by Lurking Fear? No one expected this, three days of rain turning to snow. Everyone on the wall is getting hammered. It went from summer to winter overnight.

The snow turns back to rain, then to hale, then back to snow again. Just like the gusting wind, it can’t make up its mind. I’m back on the trail now, flagging trees as I slog up the snow covered ridge. My hands are freezing, gloves soaked through, and every time I stop to fumble with the pink tape I’m urged to press on. Screw the flagging, hurry, just get to the top. But there’s nothing we can do from the summit tonight, not in this crap. All that matters now is marking our breadcrumb path through the white-out so others can follow. Flag another tree.

They’re Japanese, the party on the Nose, just like the party twenty years ago. They’re a pitch above Camp 6, just a few pitches from the top of El Cap, the absolute wrong place at the absolute wrong time. Damn it, why weren’t we here yesterday? We didn’t know. No one asked for help. But should we have known? Should we have been watching out for them? Who’s “we?” Other climbers? The government? It doesn’t matter, damn it, we’re too late.

They got themselves into this. Climbing is dangerous, everyone knows that. If it wasn’t, we wouldn’t do it. Climbing is about accepting risk, sticking your neck out. It’s about being scared, living on the edge. Without that edge it’s not climbing. The best stories are those of self reliance. The closer to the limit, to failure, to death, the better.

Bullsh#t. Climbing is about watching out for your buddy, depending on each other, helping your partner, teamwork. It’s about controlling danger, keeping it in check, saving each other from failure, from death. The best stories are those of rescue. We should have known. We should have been here yesterday.

The debate circles in my head while I search for the trail. It’s getting dark, and we’re still four miles from the summit. “I think it’s over here!” Jim calls over the wind, barely visible through the snow. He’s still fumbling with the flagging when Scott and I catch up. We’re spinning our wheels. The light is going, and we’re freezing, cold enough to cut through the ego. The smartest thing to do is find a bivy for the night and keep flagging ahead of the other teams at first light.

Scenarios play out in my head as we try to build a fire. Soon the conversation turns to stories of our own epics, stormy nights in a porta-ledge, rock fall, running out of food. We smile at our tales of pain, one-upping each other’s stories of discomfort, but inevitably the humor fades, and these stories turn back to questions about the one unfolding in front of us. Weather, equipment, time… by morning dozens of people will be following our trail. I hope we’re not too late.
Blowboarder

Boulder climber
Sandpoint, Idaho
Feb 3, 2005 - 05:11pm PT
Pretty big can of shutthef*#kup right there.

Thanks for sharing that insight into what it was really like up there.
David Nelson

climber
San Francisco
Topic Author's Reply - Feb 3, 2005 - 05:29pm PT
Great posts, Link. I have been dying for you to jump in and share both your first-hand experience of this rescue and your perspective from years of doing rescues. The input from both you and Werner was just what I was looking for in posting this thread.

Nice essay, reflects the dilemma you were in quite clearly.

I think we all agree that no one has the right to demand or expect a rescue, from YOSAR or from their friends. You need to train, plan, and execute as if you are on your own. You are.

Your timeline was to the point: the rescue would have had to start long before it was even reasonably clear that a rescue was needed, in order to have saved them.

This leads me to suggest that communication is a good practice. As a member of YOSAR, would you not recommend that parties carry communication? If they choose not to, they are free to do so, just as they are free to free solo or climb in any way that does not endanger other climbers or damage the rock. But would you not recommend, for safety, that teams carry communication? If nothing else, they can get weather updates from their friends, or call OFF rescues that are not needed when others are worried about their safety. I am not recommending that all parties carry one just so that when the beer runs low or the rain starts, so they can ask for rescue. Rescue should never be expected, we need to be trained in self-rescue, and asking for outside help in the form of a rescue should be reserved for preserving life and limb.

Also, summer is one kettle of fish, and winter ascents are quite another. The margin for error is a lot slimmer and the number of things that can go wrong is quite another. (The rescues of Harding/Rowell and Middendorf come to mind.) In winter, through no fault of your own, the weather can turn from rain to frozen ropes quite unpredictably, and then you are really screwed: self-rescue is impossible. You have to have the guts and equipment to tough it out, get rescued, or die. If one wants to taunt mother nature with a winter ascent, communication sounds as good as a backup anchor at a belay station.
Link

Trad climber
Yosemite, CA
Feb 3, 2005 - 06:26pm PT
David,

Absolutely, looking from a safety standpoint, a radio or cell phone is always a good idea. Small, light, and potentially life saving. Of course, there are more caveats with cell phones than we need to go into here (wilderness philosophy, limited function in some areas, annoying ring tones), and I’d opt for a porta-ledge if it was one or the other… but the bottom line is communication can mean everything in an emergency.

There’s nothing more terrifying, and potentially more dangerous, than true isolation. Of course, that’s part of why we go up there.
David Nelson

climber
San Francisco
Topic Author's Reply - Feb 3, 2005 - 08:22pm PT
Link, I agree. When I think of the level of commitment that it took for the FA teams (when not using seige tactics), not knowing if they could make it or not, not knowing if they had the "right" rack (hell, if their pitons would last the number of placements required), knowing that NO rescue was possible or even conceivable, I realize that we are just babes in the woods by comparison. Hell, we sleep in portaledges, they dangled in slings for the night! Instead of "Do you think this crack goes very far?", we ask, "Did you bring a copy of the SuperTopo?"

Babes in the woods.

The communications does take some of the edge off, I realize. Less of an adventure if the outcome is not in doubt until the very end. I have blasted off from the Valley floor on a FA, with no known outcome, and it was heady. Quite a thrill.

On the other hand, would not a smart climber sometimes elect to retreat if the weather takes a turn and a winter storm was on its way? Would not a smart climber want to spare the YOSAR team from sticking their necks pretty far out (I am thinking of the personal risks the teams took in October) when it was not necessary for them to come attempt a rescue?

We each make our choices. I think I would rather accept the possibility that something potentially fatal might happen up there, and communication may be the thing that gets me back to my kids. Cellphone/TalkAbout with backup for me.
'Pass the Pitons' Pete

Big Wall climber
like Oakville, Ontario, Canada, eh?
Feb 6, 2005 - 12:39pm PT
Link and Werner,

Thanks for answering my question. I now fully get why nobody got there any sooner.

Ricardo - who is actually rather clever and not normally such a complete dumbass - wrote,

".. if i thought my life was in danger .. and i was rapping 24+ pitches in a storm, i'm pretty sure i'd cut the pig loose and just let it fly to the bottom."

Lissssssssen up, kiddies - if you are stuck on a wall in a storm, and you are attempting to rappel to safety, NEVER DROP YOUR PIG! Your pig contains all your supplies to keep you alive in the event you further bugger yourself.

There is no excuse for the Japanese not to have known the rappel route since [url="http://www.supertopo.com/topos/yosemite/thenose.pdf"]the rappel route is published here on pages 15 and 16.[/url]

Rappelling with a pig, even a very heavy one, is EASY! You can click here to learn about [url="http://www.rockclimbing.com/forums/viewtopic.php?topic=4008&forum=19&5"] how to rappel with a very heavy load.[/url] I apologize - I had hoped to share a diagram of how to do this, but the person who made the diagram has removed it from where it used to be. Surprisingly, this technique is not universally known - although Ricardo in fact knows how - and within the past couple-three years one of the biggest climbing magazines actually published a technical tip that was completely wrong. If the Japanese had known how to do this, they might well be alive today. If you climb big walls, you should also know how to do this.

Cheers,

Dr. Piton
Moof

Trad climber
A cube at my soul sucking job in Nor. CA
Feb 6, 2005 - 03:50pm PT
Canadian Assassin, you're my HERO!



Cough, gag...

Bile tastes funny.
Lambone

Ice climber
Ashland, Or
Feb 6, 2005 - 08:21pm PT
"Pretty big can of shutthef*#kup right there."

uhhh...no, not really. Link is just basically saying he was asking the same questions, but there wasn't much they could do about it.

Link said.
"Yes Lambone, as you saw, it was clear on Tuesday that Ryugo and Yamanoto needed help, but by that point there was little we could do to reach them in time. Your frustration that day was justified, as was our own."

thanks for posting Link.

akclimber

Trad climber
Eagle River, AK
Feb 6, 2005 - 10:58pm PT
"The moment you tie in and head up a rock wall, you and partner are just as you came into this world, and just as you will leave it: on your own."

The voice of reason.

chutebox

climber
groveland, ca
Feb 7, 2005 - 04:12pm PT
Lamb one, or laim one... how does it feel to sit on the ground and second guess everyone?? Did you have any actual involvement in the rescue, or just another looky lue, who wants to armchair quarterback for people with way more experience than yourself?? In all of your highness, I am surprised you didn't run up to the top yourself, throw your well worn rope over the edge, and go get the stranded climbers.

You ought to apologize to Werner B ( an outstanding SAR tech I might add ) for your comments.


To Werner, Link, and other SAR personel whom actually helped...
Good job for rescueing all the other parties, despite a severe storm, multiple stranded climbers, waist deep snow, less support than promised at Tamarack Flat (ie; road not plowed adding miles to the hike) , and all the other inconviences thrown at the rescuers.


To Mr. Takeda, good artical in rock and ice issue 140. It is refreshing to see a SAR veteran, write something positive about Yosar. Seems like the COOL thing anymore is just to bag on them
David Nelson

climber
San Francisco
Topic Author's Reply - Feb 13, 2005 - 01:13am PT
Been thinking about the equipment that the Japanese team had. Although hindsight says they were underequipped, let's be fair and admit that most of us have blasted with less. They did have sleeping bags, bivy sacks, and a tarp. That does not mean that they were properly equipped, let's just be fair. They were not totally unprepared.

In that light, I think that almost any equipment would not hold up to their location, Camp VI, which is a waterfall in the rain, and they were in a pretty violent storm (read Tommy's post, reference at the opening post of this thread). Horrible luck: a very fierce storm and they are sitting under a waterfall. I know about the waterfall, but only because I have been there. I wonder if this kind of info should be associated with the route description?

Better clothes, a portaledge, and a form of communication would have made the difference, I think.
yosarmike

Mountain climber
CA
Feb 13, 2005 - 08:37pm PT
Couple of things to fill in the discussion about the "official report" and its probable value to climbers. First, the "Friends of YOSAR report" is written by Nate Knight, based on the info he has, but it isn't "official." We -- Friends of YOSAR -- raise money for YOSAR training and a lot of personal equipment, which doesn't get paid for by NPS. YOSAR is a volunteer organization, and we get paid only for "on-assignment" hours. For most of us, there's no "salary through taxes or entrance fees or whatever." So it's really appreciated when we hear references to YOSAR's "professionalism," but be aware "professionalism" doesn't equate to "fat salary."
Like Pete Takeda's account in R&I, Nate's report comes from being a part of the rescues and from talking to other participants, plus use of the CIR. The "official" version of events is called the CIR ("Critical Incident Report")by the NPS. I have build a db of these CIR reports since the 60's up through '98 (and am slowly plugging along toward the present). The db info is available from me. Send me a name and approximate date and I can send you some info. However, both the db and the original version of the CIR (except the Harding-era ones, which are a lot spicier) are pretty dull reading, because the emphasis -- this is, after all, the federal government -- is on how much money was spent on a rescue, and for what. So my suggestion is that the "official" version is not what any of us would be most interested in as climbers.
The most useful document that will come out of the October rescues will be John Dill's analysis for "Accidents in NA Mountaineering" which will be out in a few months. As with all his reports, it will be worth waiting for.
What we -- Nate and me and FOYOSAR -- would like to know is what things you would like to see on friendsofyosar.org. YOSAR's work isn't 100% climbing related, but a lot of the more difficult rescue stuff does relate to climbing, so your ideas on building the website's contents would be greatly appreciated. So would your $$, but that's another story.
David Nelson

climber
San Francisco
Topic Author's Reply - Feb 16, 2005 - 07:51pm PT
YosarMike,

I would like to see an update to John Dill's classic essay on injuries and deaths in Yosemite, and a web-based version of John's ANAM report. The nice thing about a web-based report is that there are no space limitations and the cost of color photos is zero. The published report needs to be short, but the web-based report does not. As long as it is identified, speculation and personal opinions of several participants is quite valuable, particularly if they differ. If we post a link to it here, the subsequent discussion can be as valuable as the original report.

The great thing about John's original essay is the authority with which it was written: all the advice was amply backed up with facts.
warpath

Gym climber
Sedona, AZ
Feb 17, 2005 - 12:14am PT
I tend to agree with Chutebox. I think lambone is way out of line. Is this guy a climber? a poser? a know it all? How is he so intelegent on this subject? Personally I think he is a poser that likes to start sh*t.....kind like that guy blowboarder? a couple of armchair climbers!!!!!!
Good Job Yosar!!!
Josh
WBraun

climber
Feb 17, 2005 - 12:26am PT
No he's not, he's a thinker just like us all, he was not afraid to ask some serious questions that were bothering him. His true feelings were to help his fellow man. He became frustrated that he could not save them. He’s been there at the face of death like so many of us and he had the understanding of what it’s like. His approach may have been easily misunderstood in the heat of the moment. Delusion of the real facts sometimes overcome us. He definitely is NOT a poser and a real climber to boot. Do not blow off blowboarder either as he is not what you see. One must seriously note and ponder all the facts before we come to foolish conclusions that do not fit them.
Lambone

Ice climber
Ashland, Or
Feb 17, 2005 - 12:33am PT
no, he's right...Yosar did a great job saving thos guys who were getting cold and wet tucked up in their portaledges.

cheers, here's to a job well done. All rescuers made it back and that's what counts. I'm sorry they could not save the Japanesse, it was a tough situation, one I hope to never be caught in up there.

I have deleted most of what I wrote up above, so I am sorry if alot of the posts seem out of context. Not because I didn't mean what I said, but more because I don't believe I was thinking carefully enough about the way I said it. I am sorry if I hurt anyones feelings or stirred up emotions, I meant no disrespect and don't believe I said anything that disrespected the dead, their friends or families.

WBraun said:
"He became frustrated that he could not save them."

This was true, when word broke that morning that there was no hope for them, I shed tears over it. Terrible feeling knowing climbers are dieing in front of your eyes and you can't do a damn thing about it.
T2

climber
Cardiff by the sea
Feb 17, 2005 - 12:38am PT
Right on Lambone!!
David Nelson

climber
San Francisco
Topic Author's Reply - Feb 17, 2005 - 05:14pm PT
Lambone, said like a man who takes responsibility for his own actions. I think it is all square.

I know we all were rather worked up about the whole storm, parties at risk, and the deaths. I sure was. Been on that route, hope to be on more. That is why I started this thread: what can I learn that might keep me alive? I am not interested in criticising anyone but myself. When the thread turned to criticising YOSAR, I was surprised.

Werner is pretty solid. He has said many times that he does not mind questions, that's how we learn. You have to be pretty secure in your decisions when you are willing to be second-guessed after the fact by people who were not there. Hopefully, the entire SuperTopo community has learned some things. Which leads me to something I suggested last October to Chris Mac.

The best way to solidify these lessons is for Chris to create an area on the homepage or on a page where newbies will look, and post a link to the FOYOSAR analysis and hopefully post an essay by Link or Werner or some other respected greybeard (sorry, guys) in the vein of John Dill's essay. To have the Japanese party of 20 years ago freeze to death is bad enough, to have a second party (and, oddly enough, Japanese) freeze in the same area is really frustrating. We cannot prevent all accidents, but there are some that we should be able to decrease. ST is a great resource for this. Not many newbies read Accidents in North American Mountaineering, and so won't read Link's report. Not many newbies will have read Rock and Ice of this month. However, I would bet that there is not a newbie who goes up El Cap who has not read ST. This is where it needs to get posted. How about it, Chris?
yosarmike

Mountain climber
CA
Feb 17, 2005 - 11:54pm PT
No problem for FOYOSAR to link to ST if that seems like the way to go. I think there'll be some more material coming out on the complex of rescues -- both technical analysis and description -- including a multi-media piece by Brandon Latham which really captures the incident.
David Nelson

climber
San Francisco
Topic Author's Reply - Feb 20, 2005 - 12:47pm PT
I agree that Accidents in North American Mountaineering is important reading for climbers. That is not the point. The point is that we need to put information where newbies can run across it in their early days, as they search for information. They will not do it by going to a library looking for old mountaineering mags. They will do it by surfing the net. Almost all of them will find SuperTopo, so the information must be there, or at least links to the information must be there, and placed in a prominent place so that they will find it.

Another reason is needs to be here. The net allows us unlimited space and color, which the mags do not. I have been having this conversation both off-line (old fashioned telephone) and by email with some of the FOYOSAR guys. It is not new news that we are seeing a historical large shift in how information is disseminated. I have been pushing this change in my professional journal, the Journal of Hand Surgery, and see the change (and the turmoil that accompanies it) in all scientific publishing. The net is faster, cheaper, more widely available, and has capabilities that print media do not. And the change is happening. (One example: the New England Journal of Medicine has decided to publish three articles on COX-2 inhibitors [a class of arthritis and pain drugs in the news because they have a risk of heart attacks] and two editorials, in next month's edition; they decided that they were so important, they did not want to wait until the print version came out, so they posted them online and made them available to anyone, even without a subscription to their print journal.)

The formal report in ANAM will be valuable, and needs to be archived where future researchers can find it. That is what print does well.

But the online version can have a less formal format, interviews, unlimited color, unlimited (almost) space, and with links to threads on ST, will be a dynamic and living document. Can't do that with print.

I am not against print. I am on the editorial board for my professional print journal. I just love the capabilities of the net to get the job done better.
WBraun

climber
Feb 20, 2005 - 01:52pm PT
A very good point David. Just an example to your point.

The net is a super research monster. I've educated myself on many subjects very quickly especially my dabbling in embedded microcontroller design. I had almost no understanding of the subject and was able to get 98% of the knowledge off the net very quickly for my projects.
Link

Trad climber
Yosemite, CA
Feb 20, 2005 - 05:39pm PT


I think everyone agrees: get dependable well written safety information out to climbers in the most effective way possible. Books are nice, but the web is better. Let’s do both.

It will take some time, but rest assured that we’re working on it. Over the last few years we (NPS folks) have made an effort to post information about climbing accidents as often as possible, but that effort has been somewhat sporadic: I’ve posted many brief write-ups on this site, we’ve posted some write ups on the YOSAR website, and now the Friends of YOSAR is posting links as well. Hopefully we’ll have a clear system nailed down in the next year so people can dependably get accurate and timely information about recent accidents.

In the mean time we’ll do our best to post ANAM write-ups here (or links to them) as soon as possible.

Cheers,
-Link
David Nelson

climber
San Francisco
Topic Author's Reply - Feb 22, 2005 - 05:07pm PT
Thanks, Link. Let's be sure to use the advantages of the net, which include unlimited ability to post color pictures and hyperlinks. I have urged Chris Mac to place a link on the homepage of ST to a page on his site, which can contain some data and links to other pages, such as the YOSAR site, FOYOSAR site, and to discussion threads that have further information. I am not trying to promote myself or ST, just make sure that the information is information rich and easily accessible/searchable.

The horror of the Japanese team's death is only magnified by the fact that it happened before. I think if that team had more information, they might have made different decisions.

Thanks for all your work in this area, I know you are committed.

PS I feel that we have a "link" in that my middle name is Lincoln!
ricardo

Gym climber
San Francisco, CA
Feb 22, 2005 - 06:27pm PT
earlier on this thread someone mentioned CIR's (Incident Reports) ..

.. are these public records .. does anyone know who to contact to request one ..
yosarmike

Mountain climber
CA
Feb 22, 2005 - 08:11pm PT
I mentioned "critical incident reports." I got the acronym wrong -- It's CASE Incident Reports. These are public records that are available through a FOIA request. Generally a note to the SAR office works. Keep in mind a couple of things: as these are partly accounting documents, and hence take a long time to close, and often dependent on the responsible ranger getting enough free time to do them, there can be major lag time. There isn't always, but there can be. Second, somebody has to find time to dig out the information, and that's extra work for a team that isn't exactly swamped with administrative support. As I said in my post, if you have a name and place -- like "El Cap," exact route not necessary -- and the date within a couple of years, e-mail me directly. I can send the summary data, and help out with getting the file if needed.
knighTrain

climber
Feb 23, 2005 - 07:36pm PT
Case Incident Reports tend not to be the panacea of information they might sound like. Although an occasional few contain nitty-gritty incident info, most are blow-by-blow accounts of what happened on the response side of things--when the report came in, when and what resources were sent out, what time everyone got back. Few CIRs contain analysis of the factors leading to the incident or other information that could fall under the preventative SAR umbrella.

That being said, having some facts is generally better than having none. I am posting information about recent rescues on the Friends of YOSAR site (www.friendsofyosar.org) that comes almost directly from CIRs, minus confidential patient information and uninteresting Gov-speak. Check in to the Rescues section periodically--I throw more up when I get the chance and I'm working my way back in time.

Meanwhile, the wheels are turning to provide the kind of climber-saving information and analysis that you call for, the type of info the CIRs tend to lack. Stay tuned.
David Nelson

climber
San Francisco
Topic Author's Reply - Mar 4, 2005 - 07:31pm PT
The total of the experience, gear, and grit that went into the rescues can be seen on the Friends of YOSAR site, where they have posted pictures from the rescue: http://www.friendsofyosar.org/rescues/rescuesIndex.html

Again, thanks to all who agonized over the decisions and to those who risked a lot to help the stranded climbers.
David Nelson

climber
San Francisco
Topic Author's Reply - Mar 4, 2005 - 07:52pm PT
Just got through looking at all the FOYOSAR pictures. Damn fine work. Got me to thinking: what have I done to help? Nuttin. So I sent in my check, to:

Friends of Yosemite Search & Rescue
PO BOX 611
Yosemite, CA 95389


How about you help these folks out, too? Send in something, even if it is only $5.
golsen

Social climber
kennewick, wa
Mar 4, 2005 - 08:02pm PT
I didnt have anything to do what what went on. Read about it in the magazine. But having bailed in questionable weather from up high I can relate.

YOSAR and those helping last fall...Thanks! Condolences to friends and family.
David Nelson

climber
San Francisco
Topic Author's Reply - Mar 8, 2005 - 09:55pm PT
I expected a little more response from the List when I urged you all to donate. Take a little action for all of us Yosemite climbers: the rescuers you support might just bail your lil' ol' a$$ out some time. I sent in my bucks. Please donate, Werner and Link and Dill and the rest deserve our support. Hell, YOUR support. The NPS gives them squat. Donate and urge the rest of the ST community to do so.
David Nelson

climber
San Francisco
Topic Author's Reply - Mar 8, 2005 - 10:47pm PT
Wow. Just had a long talk with John Dill, head of YOSAR. They do an incredible amount of things for the climbing community, but get scant support from the NPS for anything outside their core duties. I did not realize it, but John's reports to Accidents in North American Mountaineering are all done on his "free" time (I called him at 7 pm and he was still on the job, putting equipment away from a training run, so his "free" time is rather rare), all the postings on Friends of YOSAR are done on their "free" time, etc. They really need financial support from the climbing community so that they can devote some serious time to placing information on the web for the climbing community. The FOYOSAR website has great potential to save the NPS money by PREVENTING accidents, and the web is the way for the information to get out to the newbies and other climbers, so YOSAR has the tools. They just need the bucks to make it happen. John is hoping that FOYOSAR will help in that direction, that the NPS will see the value in web-based information and support it, and that the American Alpine Club will support it, too. It will make John's job easier, convincing the powers that be that web-based information is powerful, if the climbing community will support it, with enthusiasm, data, and money.

John is doing his part and more. How about you doing yours? Send in some bucks to Friends of YOSAR, address above. (I don't get a cut, I just like supporting things I believe in. I have sent in my check, so the next move is yours.)
yosarmike

Mountain climber
CA
Mar 8, 2005 - 11:47pm PT
Thank you, David! We're just getting started, but I thought folks would like to know specifically where FOYOSAR is putting the money it raises. The plan for the website is to make it a valuable source of information, including rescues, for climbers and other Yosemite users as well -- hikers, rafters, and the great unwashed herd who come to the Valley every year, see people on the walls, etc., and are in some vague way in favor of us and wouldn't mind chipping in. That means a pretty big site which needs to be kept fresh. The great thing is that Nate, who has as a YOSAR intern been earning zippo, can get paid by us for being webmaster plus be in the Valley as a part of YOSAR. BTW, we're very interested in hearing your ideas about what regular features on the site would be useful.
The second project is the SAR cache "training room" which has multiple purposes, of which one is to provide our team a place to kick back a little between shifts on those holiday weekends when there are multiple incidents. The great thing about it is that the work was mostly done by SAR-siters Greg and Scott, "overseen" by Werner, so again we're getting a double pay-off: great new facility, support for team members.
Another project we're looking at is offering training for local SAR teams, with our YOSAR people getting support as instructors. And finally, we're working on ways to plug in with JTree and with other teams, both in the US and, for example, Nepal, for mutual support and technical exchange.
David Nelson

climber
San Francisco
Topic Author's Reply - Mar 15, 2005 - 09:48pm PT
YosarMike,

What are the plans for this spring and summer? Is there anything that you can let us know about, that people might be interested in joining?
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