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paul roehl
Boulder climber
california
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Jan 17, 2017 - 08:01am PT
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Life begets consciousness and occurs naturally as the product of organic processes. We can be certain of that. If you're saying consciousness (life) can be imparted to non-organic material it implies the separate nature of both as phenomena “in and of themselves” in the universe, ready to be imparted and, therefore, not the specific or unique products of any particular corporeal matter at all. If that’s the case we can assume life and its product consciousness were existent phenomena since the beginning simply waiting to be manifested.
So what you seem to end up saying here is that mind (consciousness) is separate from brain.
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WBraun
climber
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Jan 17, 2017 - 08:41am PT
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Life begets consciousness
No .... it is the other way around.
Consciousness begets life.
Consciousness = life (which is not material)
Consciousness is the absolute source of all life itself .....
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Ed Hartouni
Trad climber
Livermore, CA
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Jan 17, 2017 - 09:29am PT
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I am saying that the physical laws pertain to organic and inorganic matter, "life" in this sense has to do with the particular setting in which those physical laws operate.
On Earth, and probably in many other places, the Sun provides an external energy source which drives those physical processes, non-equilibrium process, which we identify as life.
As far as we can determine, this process is not uncommon, that is, life seems to have been a feature of Earth back to nearly its creation... the Earth being 4.534 Billion years and the earliest indications of life go back to 4.1 Billion years... and survived the Late Heavy Bombardment somehow..
From a physicalist's perspective, life is just another consequence of physical law.
But is "consciousness" separable from life?
I'd argue that successful scientific theory of "consciousness" results in a description that allows "consciousness" to be simulated by something that doesn't have "life" in a biological sense.
The argument is relatively straight forward, I think, and not very controversial.
A "successful scientific theory" provides the means to predict how a physical system will act in various situations. The calculations of the theory, given inputs, induce action and that can be tested. The theory is "successful" when those calculated actions agree with a comparison of the physical system.
A major part of my argument with various philosophical ideas has been that we test "consciousness" all the time ourselves, our own "theory of mind" provides the predictions, and the behavior of the thing we are testing is compared against what we think the behavior should be.
Look at the medical profession's protocol for characterizing consciousness. Here is a practical definition of consciousness, with all the limitations of that test laid bare. For instance, if you are traveling in an area where there are no English speakers, and you have a medical crisis, many of the "question-reponse" parts of the protocol are not possible.
"Wǒ yǒu duōshǎo shǒuzhǐ?"
I couldn't respond...
The point here is that our physical theory produces behavior that cannot be distinguished from the behavior of a person, say.
There is a legitimate argument to be made concerning whether or not that thing that produces the behavior is actually conscious. But that is what a successful theory would produce.
Now we cannot say that a scientific theory of consciousness is impossible. And so, the possibility of being able to "give consciousness" to some "inanimate" stuff is not outside the realm of possibility either.
There are a couple of interesting consequences to this: 1) that we could use this theory to explore the boundaries of "consciousness" possibly answering interesting questions e.g. "what is it like to be a bat?" 2) we realize that the thing we perceive as "consciousness" is actually a part of the way our brain works, part of the behavior of the brain.
The first point is scientifically exciting, and why people have worked on this so hard for so long. The second point gets back to the issues that philosophers like Dennett have raised, that is, what we perceive as "consciousness" isn't what consciousness is.
While Largo likes to call this a "howler" it is a very common sense approach to the subject.
My favorite Dennett example is something you perceive as you look at the screen in front of you reading this. That is, it appears to be continuous.
Now any elementary knowledge of the eye would recognize that there are two rather large blind spots in your visual field, where the optic nerve enters the retina. You may have mapped out this region in some 7th grad biology class... it is real, and it does obstruct your field of view.
Yet you perceive that visual field as continuous.
Now when I was young, we were taught that the brain does an amazing job at "filling in" the holes. That is a physical process that has physical consequences, for instance, the brain activity associated with filling in the holes would be detectable. Of course there is no activity associated with this.
Instead, the brain ignores it, and uses a "model" of the visual field that presumes it is continuous, that is, our perception of the visual field is a model that takes our discontinuous sense of that field and interprets it as continuous.
We move our eyes around to "test" this model, but it is well known that if something changes in that field of view faster than our "rastering" we fail to "see it."
There is no "filling in" of the visual field, there is a perceptual model of that field. That model is the result of evolutionary adaptation, and it is a good model which has conveyed advantage to the organisms that had it.
In a way, we could say that what we see is not what we see... which sounds ridiculous, but is actually what is happening.
It is not a stretch to use this simple example as an analogy to the difference between what we perceive consciousness to be and what consciousness is... the thing we ascribe all these amazing attributes to is actually the result of our perception, not of the reality...
I think this is a very simple conclusion, but of course it has all these implications that are apparently very threatening to a large number of people.
But in the end, we do not have access to the thoughts of other people, and instead use our own theory of mind to test whether or not those people have thoughts, and what those thoughts might be.
So we depend on the behavior instantiations of "consciousness" to determine whether or not something is conscious.
Describing consciousness scientifically means being able to "produce" those behaviors in a manner that is indistinguishable from conscious beings.
While it may matter to some whether or not the thing that does the calculation of our theory is actually "conscious" it becomes a side issue. We do not know that some other person is "actually conscious" we depend on a set of "tests" compared to the predictions of our own "theory" to make that determination.
It is no different.
And therefore, "consciousness" is a behavior that an inanimate object can have.
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MikeL
Social climber
Southern Arizona
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Jan 17, 2017 - 09:53am PT
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Ed: Now whether or not we can "download" the state of a specific mind into the simulation is another issue, but a side issue I believe.
I’m not sure this is the best or only way to consider mind: as a state. It does not seem to answer the question of “what mind is.” Existence equates to states? If something has no state, then it doesn’t exist?
“What state is the water heater in?” provides only a little insight into what a water heater is. What my state of mind is currently in may not help me or others to figure out What MikeL is. Is subjectivity mind? Is consciousness mind? If it is, then what the brain is and how it works may only attempt to explain mind, but that does not define it or say what all it is. Observational explanation is not a definition of the being of anything, I’d say. Explanation is only a *one* way to say what a thing is. It’s a view, a narrative, a theory, an explanation.
jgill: We are the sum of our actions.
This constitutes a Calvinist homily. It’s the kind of thing that parents tell their children, or teachers their students. “BE SOMEONE BY ACCOMPLISHING THINGS; YOU ARE NO MORE THAN WHAT YOU DO.” Unfortunately, if one has fewer resources (things, capabilities) in their life, they will judged by others to be inferior.
There appears to be a conflagration between two assertions often made here. (1) Mind is subjectivity (whatever *that* is and however one could pin it down). This appears to be Searle’s and Largo’s argument. To say that subjectivity is consciousness is a tautology: we learn nothing new. (2) Mind is what mind does (hence Ed’s and science’s focus on observation of activities). This seems to suggest that entities that do nothing, do not exist. It provides one perspective, but it could hardly cover all.
These are almost pure philosophy issues.
It might be important to say what subjectivity is. I don’t believe anyone can say what it is. All one can do is point at subjectivity’s apparent manifestation. Read a novel, see a movie, listen to people’s stories, lie on a couch in a therapist’s office, read interpretations of myth. Right there is subjectivity. What is it?
Subjectivity could be absolutely anything, *and* it could be nothing.
(I see that there are a number of cable series are coming forward to promote scary AI narratives. We’ll be up to our eyeballs in science fiction narratives.)
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MH2
Boulder climber
Andy Cairns
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Jan 17, 2017 - 10:01am PT
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This, other sites, and human history pretty conclusively show, despite agreed upon total mastery of rational thought, humans quite regularly run off the road. We seem to be assuming artificial attempts at intelligence will not suffer from the same flaw? If it does suffer from this flaw the new creation will arguably be artificial but unintelligent.
I also worry that such a creation could be highly intelligent but insane, to use a possibly obsolete and anthropomorphic term.
It seems quite possible that the more intelligent you are the less rational you appear to others.
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paul roehl
Boulder climber
california
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Jan 17, 2017 - 11:19am PT
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I'd argue that successful scientific theory of "consciousness" results in a description that allows "consciousness" to be simulated by something that doesn't have "life" in a biological sense.
But as an argument this still fails to address the issue since simulation is just that. Simulation implies a distinguishing lack of authenticity. If something is a simulation of consciousness how can it be said to actually be conscious?
In the end I see no evidence that life can be instilled in an inorganic machine for the purpose of producing consciousness, based on the notion that complexity alone is the holy grail of that conscious thought when at its foundation consciousness is differentiated from information processing by the unique properties of subjective experience and realization.
Again, it sounds as though you agree that consciousness stands alone as a phenomena exterior to the matter or structure that produces that consciousness and is simply waiting to be installed. If so, why can't we also say consciousness stands as a universal predicate.
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MH2
Boulder climber
Andy Cairns
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Jan 17, 2017 - 04:03pm PT
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the unique properties of subjective experience and realization
Unique in what way? Unique to humans? Unique to consciousness?
How could you know that those properties are unique?
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paul roehl
Boulder climber
california
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Jan 17, 2017 - 04:26pm PT
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How could you know that those properties are unique?
A better question is how can you know that they aren't unique? Where's the proof that a rock realizes anything, a piece of metal, a series of circuits no matter how complex they may be.
I recognize consciousness when I interact with it. If you can fool me into that recognition, you've only fooled me. You haven't produced consciousness.
Every human is aware of their own consciousness and, as a result, becomes aware of it in others. I don't buy the notion of absolute subjectivity because humanity is by nature a species in which experience is a commonality and human beings are all much more alike than they are different.
The idea that I can't know your consciousness assumes I can't recognize the subtleties of consciousness in others when, of course, I can. If not, then how is it a sophisticated machine might fool me into thinking it was alive and thoughtful? Even Turin thought that a high bar indeed. Well, if I can't recognize consciousness in others anyway why does the bar have to be set so high?
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jgill
Boulder climber
The high prairie of southern Colorado
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Jan 17, 2017 - 04:29pm PT
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In the end I see no evidence that life can be instilled in an inorganic machine for the purpose of producing consciousness . . .
Once again, an argument about the future predicated upon evidence gathered from the present or the past. Sounds a lot like what JL was saying.
Never say never.
;>)
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WBraun
climber
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Jan 17, 2017 - 04:38pm PT
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We do not know that some other person is "actually conscious" we depend on a set of "tests"
Any living being automatically has consciousness.
There is no test required.
Even a simple blade of grass has consciousness.
All life has consciousness otherwise it would be dead matter ......
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paul roehl
Boulder climber
california
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Jan 17, 2017 - 05:16pm PT
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Never say never.
A blade with two distinct edges cutting in a variety of directions.
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MH2
Boulder climber
Andy Cairns
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Jan 17, 2017 - 06:00pm PT
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Where's the proof that a rock realizes anything, a piece of metal, a series of circuits no matter how complex they may be.
Do you think that a chimpanzee realizes anything? How about a cat?
Do you still insist that the properties you mentioned are unique?
If so, unique to what?
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rbord
Boulder climber
atlanta
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Jan 17, 2017 - 08:07pm PT
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I recognize consciousness when I interact with it. If you can fool me into that recognition, you've only fooled me. You haven't produced consciousness.
If you can be fooled into that recognition, can you really recognize it? How do you know it is what you believe it is, if you can be fooled into believing that it is what you think it is, when it's not?
Every human is aware of their own consciousness and, as a result, becomes aware of it in others.
But those others maybe can fool you into a recognition of it when it doesn't exist? But you can't fool yourself into recognizing it in yourself?
Maybe that's why we're so sure that what we believe is true, even though we know that we might be fooled into that belief, by others, or by ourselves. As a belief process, it's been working out for us so far I guess.
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Ed Hartouni
Trad climber
Livermore, CA
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Jan 17, 2017 - 08:58pm PT
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The interesting point here is that I am not arguing that this simulation that I talk about is necessarily "consciousness"
Largo argued that Virtual Reality isn't, in fact, reality, which is true, yet people have reactions to what happens in Virtual Reality that are profound, as if those experience were "real." This will become a bigger and bigger problem in the future...
...but the point is, the simulation acts like it has consciousness at a level of detail that it "fools" us.
Turning this around, since we have no access to someone else's first person experience, we are left only to assume that they have them. We "test" them, if we can, and if they match our test they are considered "conscious." While this is more the norm in our modern world, it was not when there were far fewer of us, and our language and customs unknown to others. So while we recognize the wide diversity of human form, language, culture, it is a relatively modern circumstance.
Previously, we had no way to judge the "humanity" of some other humanoid... no way of establishing if they were conscious.
Finally, even a "normal" looking person may be "unconscious." It has happened to me in the past, when having suffered a concussion, that I appeared to the people around me as "conscious." I was interacting, etc... but little things, to them, made them aware that perhaps I wasn't "all there" like forgetting my locker combination. Off to the school nurse with you!
And then "waking up" some time later, with my mother coming in to take me home... probably a total of an hour with absolutely no memory of what happened, to me I was "unconscious" absolutely no first person experience, no awareness at all...
where did it go? Why didn't the other people know?
The "test" I failed was behavioral, it wasn't some "innate sense" of my loss of consciousness... I was acting abnormally for me...
The "conflation" here is to assign to that process of the brain our perceived sense of "mind" when that is not what is happening. We certainly cannot explain that sense of mind, because it is a model of what is happening, a very useful model, but one that doesn't have, nor need to have, a detailed "theory" of what is happening.
You will fail to produce a scientific theory for a phenomenon that is not real.
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jgill
Boulder climber
The high prairie of southern Colorado
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Jan 17, 2017 - 10:18pm PT
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It has happened to me in the past, when having suffered a concussion, that I appeared to the people around me as "conscious."
A distinction noted sometime ago: being "aware" but not "conscious", although most consider the two states the same.
With this distinction a machine can easily be aware and react.
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MikeL
Social climber
Southern Arizona
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Jan 18, 2017 - 08:19am PT
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Science . . . . Fiction. . . .
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MH2
Boulder climber
Andy Cairns
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Jan 18, 2017 - 08:46am PT
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Science . . . . Fiction. . . .
Oddy and Id
Alfred Bester
1950
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Ed Hartouni
Trad climber
Livermore, CA
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Jan 18, 2017 - 09:18am PT
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I'd call it speculation...
but in the sense of Rutherford, who hurled it as an accusation, effectively. I learned it as a pejorative from an old professor of mine, Sam Devons, who was a student of Rutherford's, when I attended graduate school at Columbia. I was a teaching assistant for him for a course he taught at Bernard College on the history of science.
This accusation was so potent that various British scientists took to defending themselves of it during notable lectures. Arthur Eddington, in a famous talk given before the British Association for the Advancement of Science in 1920 wrote:
"I should not be surprised if it is whispered that this address has at times verged on being a little bit speculative; perhaps some outspoken friend may bluntly say that it has been highly speculative from beginning to end. I wonder what is the touchstone by which we may test the legitimate development of scientific theory and reject the idly speculative. We all know of theories which the scientific mind instinctively rejects as fruitless guesses; but it is difficult to specify their exact defect or to supply a rule which will show us when we ourselves do err...
If we are not content with the dull accumulations of experimental facts, if we make any deductions or generalizations, if we seek for any theory to guide us, some degree of speculation cannot be avoided."
He had just presented a model of stars, and included the highly speculative notion that "building' of Helium from four Hydrogens left a mass defect, that is, the mass of the Helium was less than the mass of 4 Hydrogens, and that if that process occurred in the Sun, it would generate sufficient energy to explain what had never been explained previously: the physical explanation of the Sun's generation of energy. I would not be surprised if the "outspoken friend" was a reference to Rutherford.
This was a spectacular "speculation" for a number of reasons, but one of the more spectacular implications was that it also explained how the age of the universe could be billions of years old. He states "There is sufficient in the Sun to maintain its output of heat for 15 billion years."
At this time Quantum Mechanics had not yet been invented, Bohr had just, a couple of years earlier, published his theory of atoms using the "old" quantum mechanics, the neutron was yet to be discovered.
F. W. Ashton had measured the atomic masses of Hydrogen and Helium (and a number of other elements) just the year before, it was these "experimental facts" and some thought on the topic of stars which had been kicking around for a bit, that got put together into this brilliant speculation.
Oliphant, in Rutherford's lab, experimentally observed light ion fusion and published in 1934, 14 years later...
By Hans Bethe's paper in 1939, most of the mechanism for stellar fusion cycles had been worked out, even as the much of the nuclear science had yet to be done. It is not too surprising that Eddington was wrong in the details, but correct in identifying nuclear fusion as the source of energy of stars.
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MikeL
Social climber
Southern Arizona
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Jan 18, 2017 - 05:06pm PT
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Ed: I'd call it speculation...
:-) Indeed. I love them. The more careful you are, the more knowledgeable, the more experienced in the craft, the more fascinating they become.
Cheers. It’s most always good to read you, . . . er, . . . your writing.
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